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Post-Firestone Skirmishes: The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Discretionary Clauses, and Judicial Review
of ERISA Plan Administrator Decisions
Maria O‘Brien Hylton*
Since the Supreme Court's Firestone decision, ERISA plan administrators
have enjoyed broad discretion and deferential review in benefits claims
litigation. Language in Firestone that offered discretion and deference in
exchange for a simple discretionary clause led, in time, to attempts by
various state insurance commissioners to limit or ban the use of
discretionary clauses on the ground that they often lead to unjust outcomes
for plan participants. Various state efforts to inject a degree of fairness into
the benefits denial review process have been met with preemption
challenges, however. This article contrasts the Court‘s consistent support
for discretionary clauses with the thus-far unanimous support of the federal
courts of appeal for the position that states can ban or limit the use of such
clauses without running afoul of ERISA's broad preemption language. This
paper also evaluates the PPACA's requirement of universal and
independent external review and suggests that, at least in the near term, the
contested terrain of discretionary clauses will not change significantly.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch,1 ERISA plan administrators have largely been insulated from
de novo review in cases involving denial of benefits. This is because
Firestone, while acknowledging that Congress did not specify a standard of
review in civil actions to recover benefits, 2 concluded that ―a denial of
benefits . . . is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.‖3 The
now-standard language in most health and disability plans that grants broad
discretion to the plan administrator is commonly known as a discretionary
clause and ensures that a reviewing court will use the highly deferential
―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard in evaluating a denial of benefits. 4
While de novo review is still technically available—for example, in cases
*
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in which the plan drafters failed to include a discretionary clause 5—as a
practical matter, plaintiffs in most benefit denial cases are at a huge
disadvantage.6 Since Firestone, many judges and other commentators have
bemoaned the enormous difficulty faced by plaintiffs who seem to have a
strong claim to promised benefits, only to find themselves unable to meet
the very high bar required for a finding of arbitrary and capricious
behavior.7
In the years following Firestone, employee benefit plan administrators
in all fifty states quickly inserted discretionary clauses into governing plan
documents, which has led many state insurance commissioners to attempt
to limit or ban the use of these clauses. 8 As with so many other contested
areas of ERISA, these state efforts to inject a degree of procedural fairness
into the benefits denial review process have met preemption challenges. 9 In
this respect, ongoing litigation about the ability of state insurance
authorities to ban discretionary clauses is similar to other ERISA battles:
the state attempts to regulate under the guise of the savings clause in a way
that it believes will rectify ERISA‘s bias in favor of plan autonomy, after
which the plan community and insurers respond with a preemption
challenge.10
In March of 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 11—sometimes referred to
colloquially as ―Obama Care.‖ This statute, together with the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act that the President signed into law one
week later,12 amended certain provisions of part A of title XXVII of the
Public Health Service Act relating to group health plans and health
insurance issuers of group and individual coverage. 13 The Departments of
the Treasury, Labor, and Health & Human Services issued interim final
regulations in May, June, and July of 2010 that effectively implemented
new requirements for group health plans and health insurers in both the
group and individual markets.14 The PPACA also added section 715(a)(1)
to ERISA and section 9815(a)(1) to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in
order to incorporate part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act
into ERISA and the IRC.15 The addition of these sections was intended to
make the statutes applicable to group health plans and health insurance
providers who offer coverage related to group health plans; however,
section 1251 of the PPACA provides that certain ―grandfathered plans‖ or
health insurance coverage existing as of the statute‘s March 2010
enactment are subject to only some of the PPACA‘s provisions. 16 As we
shall see, a plan can lose its grandfathered status if its administrator takes
certain affirmative steps or fails to take required actions. 17 Most
importantly, all plans are now subject to new, complex external review
requirements that depend on whether they are grandfathered and whether
they are insured or self-insured.18
The prototype benefits claim litigation involves an employee/participant
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in an ERISA-regulated welfare plan who seeks payment for a medical
condition, which may or may not be disabling. The plan administrator,
operating subject to plan terms that grant broad discretion, determines that
the participant‘s claim is not payable under the terms of the plan and denies
the claim. This denial triggers a flurry of specialists‘ reports, independent
physician evaluations, and other documents that the plan administrator
considers during the ERISA-mandated internal review.19 As of March
2010, if the internal review results in denial, the participant can request an
independent external review subject to the applicable state insurance rule 20
and the governing plan‘s status.21 If no appropriate state process is
available, the participant may resort to the federal external review
process.22
Prior to the PPACA, a claimant whose plan was self-insured typically
had no choice but to pursue a claim in federal court to recover the disputed
benefit under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B).23 Some insured plans were
subject to Rush-type external review requirements, such as an independent
medical review of benefit denials, depending upon applicable state
insurance regulations. 24 Participants in insured plans could sue to recover
promised benefits as well. 25
This article examines the development of discretionary clauses and
contrasts the Supreme Court‘s consistent support for these clauses with the
(thus far) unanimous support by the courts of appeals for the position that
states can limit or ban such clauses without running afoul of ERISA‘s
broad preemption language. It also considers the PPACA‘s requirement of
universal independent external review and suggests that, at least in the short
term, the contested terrain of discretionary clauses will not change much.
Although there is at present no conflict among the circuits (which
would normally increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court would take
up a discretionary clause/preemption case 26), it seems likely that the high
court will soon have occasion to consider whether ERISA preempts efforts
to regulate discretionary clauses; in addition, the PPACA‘s new rules
imposing external review requirements on non-grandfathered group health
plans and health insurance issuers offering group or individual health
insurance coverage27 are certain to complicate matters for both plans and
claimants.28 Should the Court continue to favor the use of discretionary
clauses, the states will once again find themselves in the familiar position
of trying to employ devices to regulate ERISA insurance plans that are
immune from attack on preemption grounds but that now also have to
comply with the requirements of the PPACA.
This paper argues that an independent external review process that
would correct and/or avoid the kinds of defects that Firestone deference has
engendered would be superior to the current regime, which promises a high
degree of deference to plan administrators at the occasional expense of
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fairness for claimants. It remains to be seen, however, whether the kind of
external review mandated by the PPACA interim final regulations will
provide both the operational simplicity that plans need and the substantive
fairness that claimants hope for.
I. THE ERISA FRAMEWORK AND JUDICIAL REVIEW SINCE
FIRESTONE
A. ERISA AND BENEFITS CLAIM LITIGATION
Under § 3(1), ERISA regulates welfare benefit plans that provide
―medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment‖ through the
purchase of insurance.29 Congress enacted ERISA to protect the ―interests
of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal Courts.‖30 ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) allows plan participants and beneficiaries to bring a civil
action in federal court to recover their benefits, enforce their rights, or
clarify their rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.31
Congress ensured that employee benefit regulation would be
―exclusively a federal concern‖ by enacting ―expansive pre-emption
provisions‖ under ERISA § 514. 32 Section 514(a) states that ERISA ―shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan.‖33 However, Congress retained an exception
to § 514(a) by providing in § 514(b)(2)(A) that ―[n]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.‖ 34 Section
514(b)(2)(A), commonly known as the ―savings clause,‖ 35 protects state
laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities from ERISA‘s preemption scheme. Congress qualified this statutory exception in §
514(b)(2)(B), also known as the ―deemer clause,‖ stating that ―[n]either an
employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall
be deemed to be an insurance company . . . for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies.‖36 Specifically, §
514(b)(2)(B) preempts state insurance laws from regulating self-funded
ERISA plans on the ground that such plans are not insured and may not be
deemed to be insurance companies within the meaning of the savings
clause.37 Therefore, the deemer clause limits the reach of the savings clause
and fortifies ERISA‘s preemption provisions.
Although ERISA establishes a broad pre-emption scheme under § 514
and sets out civil enforcement provisions in § 502, the statute does not
specify what standard of review applies to benefit determinations by plan
fiduciaries under § 502(a)(1)(B). ERISA merely states in § 503(2) that an
employee benefit plan shall provide a full and fair review by the
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appropriate fiduciary of a benefits claim denial. 38
It is not surprising that plan drafters have taken advantage of ERISA‘s
unspecified standard of review regarding benefit denials by inserting
discretionary clauses into plan terms that instruct judges to defer to the plan
administrator‘s decisions. Recent cases have raised the question of whether
state regulations banning discretionary clauses are a valid exercise of the
state power to regulate insurance, and whether courts must apply the plan‘s
deferential standard of review or evaluate benefit denials de novo. The
following section summarizes the relevant Supreme Court decisions on
discretionary clauses.
B. THE SUPREME COURT LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR DISCRETIONARY
CLAUSES
Commentators who have discussed the proliferation of discretionary
clauses in ERISA-regulated plans have generally taken the Supreme
Court‘s 1989 decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch as their
starting point.39 John Langbein argued in ―Trust Law as Regulatory Law:
The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials under
ERISA,‖ that Firestone ―all but invited [bad faith benefit denials by
allowing plan sponsors] to impose self-serving terms that severely restrict
the ability of a reviewing court to correct a wrongful benefit denial.‖ 40
In Firestone, several former Firestone Tire employees sought severance
benefits under a termination pay plan after Firestone sold the plants where
they worked to Occidental Petroleum Company. 41 Firestone, acting as the
plan administrator and fiduciary, denied the employees‘ severance benefits
because Occidental rehired them for the same positions without reduction
in work or pay. 42 Under the terms of the termination pay plan, a reduction
in work was a requirement for severance benefit eligibility. 43 As the case
turned on an assessment of Firestone‘s benefit denial, the Supreme Court
sought to clarify the ―appropriate standard of judicial review of benefit
determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA.‖ 44
Looking to principles of trust law, the Supreme Court held that de novo
is the appropriate standard of review of benefit denials challenged under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), ―unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan.‖ 45 Discretionary clauses require courts to
review benefit denials under an abuse of discretion standard. 46 The Court
emphasized that de novo is the default standard of review ―regardless of
whether the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or
actual conflict of interest,‖47 such as an insurance company that acts as
payor of benefits and evaluator of benefit claims. 48 If, however, a plan
grants discretionary authority to an administrator or fiduciary who is
operating under a conflict of interest, the courts must weigh that conflict
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―as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.‖ 49
Langbein and others have criticized Firestone as making it easier for
plan administrators to deny claims because of the availability of deferential
review in the courts.50 Mark DeBofsky has also argued that Firestone
changed the relationship between insurers and insureds by permitting
insurers to include favorable terms in their insurance policies, which
deprive benefit claimants of plenary review in the courts.51 DeBofsky
concluded that Firestone ultimately undermined claimants‘ rights under
employee benefit plans by making those rights depend on ―the degree of
discretion lodged in the administrator.‖52
The Supreme Court appeared to shift away from Firestone in Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran. In Rush, Moran sought reimbursement for
a surgery as ―medically necessary‖ under the Illinois HMO Act.53 Through
her husband, Moran was the beneficiary of an employer-sponsored and
ERISA-governed welfare benefit plan. 54 The plan contracted with Rush to
provide medical services to plan participants and their beneficiaries. 55 The
plan also granted Rush the ―broadest possible discretion‖ to determine
whether a medical service is covered under the plan as ―medically
necessary.‖56
By contrast, the Illinois HMO Act sought to regulate the decision
making of health maintenance organizations (HMOs). 57 The Illinois statute
required HMOs to provide an independent medical review if a plan
participant or beneficiary‘s primary care physician and the HMO disagreed
on the medical necessity of a procedure.58 The Act stated that the HMO
―shall provide the covered service‖ if the independent reviewer determines
it to be medically necessary. 59
Moran‘s primary care physician recommended she undergo surgery, but
Rush refused to pay for the procedure on the ground that it was not
medically necessary. 60 Rush continued to deny Moran‘s claim even after an
independent reviewer concluded that the surgery was medically
necessary. 61 Moran consequently had the surgery at her own expense and
sued Rush in state court under the Illinois HMO Act. 62 Rush removed the
case to federal court, arguing that Moran‘s claim for benefits was
―completely preempted by ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions.‖63 The
relevant legal question was whether the Illinois HMO Act contravenes
ERISA‘s enforcement scheme, as well as Firestone deference, by requiring
that an independent physician review the benefit denial de novo.
The Supreme Court held that the Illinois HMO Act ―does not implicate
ERISA‘s enforcement scheme at all, and is no different from the types of
substantive plan regulation of insurance contracts we have in the past
permitted to survive preemption.‖ 64 The Court reasoned that although the
Illinois statute precludes deferential review, ―this effect of eliminating an
insurer‘s autonomy to guarantee terms congenial to its own interests is the
stuff of garden variety insurance regulation through the imposition of
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standard policy terms.‖65 The Court found that the Illinois statute survives
under ERISA‘s savings clause because it is ―hard to imagine a reservation
of state power to regulate insurance that would not be meant to cover
restrictions of the insurer‘s advantage in this kind of way.‖ 66
The Rush Court weakened discretionary clauses by explicitly taking the
view that state insurance regulation ―is not preempted merely because it
conflicts with substantive plan terms.‖ 67 The Court noted that there were
clear limits on the enforceability of discretionary clauses, as nothing in
ERISA permits insurers to ―displace any state regulation simply by
inserting a contrary term in plan documents. This interpretation would
virtually rea[d] the saving clause out of ERISA.‖ 68 The Court emphasized
that ―the independent reviewer‘s de novo examination of the benefit claim
mirrors the general or default rule we have ourselves recognized [in
Firestone].‖69
Notably, the Rush Court declined to clarify ―the degree to which a plan
provision for unfettered discretion in benefit determinations guarantees
truly deferential review.‖ 70 The Court found instead that Rush did not
require an answer to this question. 71 Instead, Rush emphasized, ―We have
read [ERISA] to require a uniform judicial regime of categories of relief
and standards of conduct, not a uniformly lenient regime of reviewing
benefit determinations.‖ 72 While the Court noted that discretionary clauses
are ―simply a matter of plan design or the drafting of an HMO contract‖
and are not required by ERISA,73 it was silent about the extent of judicial
deference when a court reviews a discretionary decision of a plan
administrator who both funds the plan and evaluates benefit claims. 74
The Supreme Court finally addressed the conflicted plan administrator
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn in 2008. Glenn involved a challenge
to an adverse benefit determination where the decision maker acted as both
plan administrator and insurer.75 Respondent Wanda Glenn was employed
by Sears and was diagnosed with a heart condition, the symptoms of which
included fatigue and shortness of breath. 76 Glenn also participated in an
ERISA-governed long-term disability insurance plan through Sears. 77
Petitioner MetLife served as the plan administrator and insurer. 78 The plan
granted MetLife discretion to determine eligibility for benefits and to pay
valid benefit claims. 79
Glenn applied for disability benefits in 2000, and MetLife approved the
claim for an initial 24-month period because Glenn could not perform her
job duties. 80 MetLife also directed Glenn to a law firm that would help her
apply for Social Security benefits. 81 In 2002, an administrative law judge
found that Glenn‘s disability prevented her from performing any jobs for
which she could qualify and which exist ―in significant numbers in the
national economy.‖82 As a result, the Social Security Administration
granted Glenn permanent disability benefits retroactive to 2000.83 Glenn,
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however, kept none of the retroactive benefits because three-quarters went
to MetLife to offset its more generous plan benefits, and the rest went to
Glenn‘s lawyers. 84
In order to receive plan disability benefits beyond the 24-month period,
Glenn had to show that her disability prevented her from performing her
job and ―the material duties of any gainful occupation for which she was
‗reasonably qualified.‘‖ 85 MetLife refused to extend Glenn‘s disability
benefits because it found that she could perform full-time sedentary work.86
Glenn subsequently filed a federal lawsuit challenging MetLife‘s denial of
benefits. 87 The district court denied relief and Glenn appealed to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 88 The Sixth Circuit applied Firestone deference
in its review because the plan explicitly granted MetLife discretion to
determine eligibility for benefits. 89 The court also treated MetLife‘s conflict
of interest as a relevant factor.90
The Sixth Circuit set aside MetLife‘s denial of benefits because of the
conflict of interest and other issues. 91 MetLife sought review before the
Supreme Court on the question of whether a plan administrator who
evaluates and pays benefit claims operates under a conflict of interest. 92
The Solicitor General suggested that the Supreme Court also consider how
conflicts of interest are to be taken into account in reviewing discretionary
benefit determinations. 93 The Court granted certiorari on both questions. 94
The case turned on the interpretation of the Firestone principle that a
fiduciary‘s conflict of interest must be weighed as a factor in determining
whether there is an abuse of discretion. 95 The first question that the Court
addressed was whether a plan administrator who evaluates and pays benefit
claims operates under the kind of conflict of interest to which the Court
referred in Firestone.96 The Court determined that the plan administrator
was indeed conflicted.97 The Court also acknowledged that a conflict of
interest exists in the case of an employer who both funds the plan and
evaluates benefit claims. 98 Not surprisingly, then, the Court held that judges
must consider an employer‘s conflict of interest in reviewing discretionary
benefit determinations. 99
MetLife argued that an employer who funds and administers a plan has
implicitly approved the resulting conflict of interest.100 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument based on principles of trust law.101 The Glenn Court
noted that nothing in trust law requires a judge to forgo careful scrutiny
even if the settlor has approved a trustee‘s conflict of interest. 102 In
response, MetLife pointed out that the Supreme Court need not follow
principles of trust law where trust law conflicts with ERISA‘s language,
structure, and purpose.103 Specifically, MetLife argued that to find a
conflict of interest frustrates Congressional efforts to avoid complex review
procedures and encourage employers to create benefit plans.104 MetLife
also claimed that to find a conflict of interest violates 29 U.S.C. §
1108(c)(3), permitting employers to administer their own plans. 105 The
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Court again rejected MetLife‘s arguments and concluded that, ―taken
together, we believe them outweighed by ‗Congress‘s desire to offer
employees enhanced protection for their benefits.‘‖106
The Court next considered whether a conflict of interest exists where an
insurance company acts as the plan administrator and has discretionary
authority to evaluate and pay benefit claims. 107 Once again, the Court found
three reasons for a conflict of interest.108 First, an employer choosing a plan
administrator would typically prefer an insurance company with low rates
to one with accurate claims processing;109 second, ERISA imposes clear
duties of care and loyalty on insurers to act in the best interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries;110 and third, ―a legal rule that treats
insurance company administrators and employers alike with respect to the
existence of a conflict of interest can nonetheless take account of
circumstances‖ that diminish the conflict. 111 Noting that insurers have a
strong incentive to provide accurate claims processing because the
marketplace punishes companies that offer subpar insurance products,112
the Court suggested this market pressure might reduce ―the significance or
severity of the conflict in individual cases.‖ 113
The Supreme Court next examined how judges should account for a
conflict of interest in reviewing discretionary benefit determinations. 114 The
Court reiterated its holding in Firestone that courts must weigh a conflict of
interest as a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. 115
The Court also clarified that the mere presence of a conflict of interest
implies no change in the standard of review from deferential to de novo
review.116 Instead, judges must continue to apply a deferential standard
where conflicted trustees make discretionary decisions. 117 At the same time,
judges must also consider a trustee‘s conflict of interest in determining if
there has been an abuse of discretion. 118
The Court refused to overturn Firestone ―by adopting a rule that in
practice could bring about near universal review by judges de novo—i.e.,
without deference—of the lion‘s share of ERISA plan claims denials.‖119
The Court declined to take such an action without more explicit guidance
from Congress. 120 The Court also refused to create special burden-of-proof
rules in cases where there is a conflict of interest. 121 Instead, the Court held
that conflicts of interest are ―but one factor among many that a reviewing
judge must take into account.‖122 Finally, the Court acknowledged that, in
some instances, a conflict of interest could prove more important because
circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that the conflict affected a
benefit decision.123 In other instances, a conflict of interest could prove less
important because the administrator ―has taken active steps to reduce
potential bias and to promote accuracy,‖ such as imposing penalties for
inaccurate decision-making.124 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the
judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 125
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In 2010, the high court once again took up discretionary clauses in
Conkright v. Frommert. 126 In Conkright, respondents left Xerox‘s employ
in the 1980s, received lump sum distributions of their retirement benefits,
and later returned to work at Xerox.127 To calculate respondents‘ current
benefits and avoid paying the same benefits twice, the administrator
interpreted Xerox‘s pension plan to require an approach known as the
―phantom account‖ method.128 The method calculated the hypothetical
growth of respondents‘ past distributions if the money had remained in
Xerox‘s investment funds, and reduced respondents‘ current benefits
accordingly. 129 The administrator had general authority under the plan to
construe the plan terms. 130
Respondents challenged the phantom account method in administrative
proceedings.131 After the administrator denied the challenge, respondents
sued in federal court under ERISA.132 The district court applied a
deferential standard of review to the administrator‘s interpretation of the
plan terms and granted summary judgment for the plan. 133 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the district court‘s
decision, holding that the ―Plan Administrator's interpretation was
unreasonable and that respondents had not been adequately notified that the
phantom account method would be used to calculate their benefits.‖ 134
On remand, the plan administrator proposed a different approach to
calculate the present value of past distributions using an interest rate ―that
was fixed at the time of the distribution.‖135 Unlike the phantom account
method, which ―calculated the present value of a past distribution based on
events that occurred after the distribution was made,‖ the new approach
calculated the ―current value of the distribution based on information that
was known at the time of the distribution.‖ 136 The district court did not
apply a deferential standard of review to the new approach and rejected the
plan administrator‘s interpretation of the plan. 137 Instead, the district court
found that the plan was ambiguous and adopted the respondents‘
approach.138 This approach did not account for the time value of money and
reduced respondents‘ present benefits ―only by the nominal amount of their
past distributions—thereby treating a dollar distributed to respondents in
the 1980‘s as equal in value to a dollar distributed today.‖ 139 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding that the district court did
not err in refusing to apply a deferential standard of review and did not
abuse discretion. 140
The Supreme Court agreed to consider two questions: first, whether the
district court owed deference to the administrator‘s interpretation of the
plan on remand; and second, whether the court of appeals properly deferred
to the district court on the merits. 141 However, the Supreme Court found it
necessary to address only the first question. 142 The Court first considered
the Second Circuit‘s rule that a court can forfeit deferential review if it
previously found that an administrator‘s interpretation of plan terms
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violated ERISA.143 The Court rejected the Second Circuit‘s rule as having
no basis in Firestone or in the terms of the plan.144 Firestone, the Court
noted, established a broad standard of deference ―without any suggestion
that the standard was susceptible to ad hoc exceptions like the one adopted
by the Court of Appeals.‖ 145 Moreover, the Court had recently refused in
Glenn to create exceptions to the Firestone standard, holding that even a
systemic conflict of interest does not strip the plan administrator of
deference. 146 In light of Glenn, the Conkright Court declined to say that an
administrator‘s ―single honest mistake‖ in choosing the method of
calculating benefits ―would require a different result.‖147
The Conkright Court also looked to principles of trust law, but
determined that trust law ―is unclear on the narrow question before us.‖ 148
Instead, the Supreme Court found that the guiding principles underlying
ERISA resolved the issue in the case. 149 According to the Court, Firestone
deference protects important Congressional interests relating to employee
benefit plans. 150 Deference preserves the balance in ERISA between
ensuring enforcement of plan rights and encouraging plan creation.151
Additionally, deference ―promotes efficiency by encouraging resolution of
benefits disputes through internal administrative proceedings rather than
costly litigation.‖152 Finally, deference protects interests in predictability
and uniformity by ―helping to avoid a patchwork of different interpretations
of a plan, like the one here.‖ 153 In other words, nothing in Glenn or
Conkright suggests that the Court is losing its enthusiasm for Firestone
deference. Nonetheless, Justice Breyer dissented sharply from the Court‘s
opinion.154
Thus, the current rule on discretionary clauses is that plans may give
their fiduciaries discretionary authority to evaluate claims and pay benefits.
This grant of discretion will trigger deferential review in the event that a
claimant objects to a denial. In cases of conflict this standard of review is
not automatically altered from deferential to de novo. Rather, it is but one
factor that courts must consider in determining if there has been an abuse of
discretion by the fiduciary. Since Firestone, and in the absence of explicit
guidance from Congress, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
validity of discretionary clauses and the deferential standard of review in
examining benefit decisions, even in cases of conflict. The PPACA
unquestionably represents new guidance from Congress in this area,
although it only indirectly addresses the problem of Firestone deference by
creating independent external review for all plan participants. 155 The new
statute does directly tackle the problem of conflicted decision making by
insisting on impartial, external reviewers in benefits denial cases. 156
Whether the post-PPACA reviews will in fact be independent and beyond
the scope of insurer influence remains to be seen.
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II. IMPLICIT SUPPORT FOR DE NOVO REVIEW
A. AN EMERGING CONSENSUS IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS
Henry Quillen has argued that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Rush
―catalyzed an organized response to discretionary clauses by state insurance
regulators.‖157 The response in many cases was to ban the clauses for
insured (but not for self-insured)158 plans. This response to the nearuniversal use of discretionary clauses has predictably led to several
challenges in the courts of appeals.
In American Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, the Sixth Circuit upheld
Michigan‘s ban on discretionary clauses in insurance contracts and
policies. 159 The insurance industry argued that the rules are preempted by §
514(a) of ERISA and do not fall ―within the ambit of ERISA‘s savings
clause.‖160 The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that
Michigan‘s rules avoid federal preemption because they are state laws
regulating insurance and consequently fall ―within the ambit of ERISA‘s
savings clause.‖161
The Sixth Circuit first considered whether Michigan‘s rules barring
discretionary clauses are, in fact, state laws that regulate insurance within
the meaning of ERISA‘s savings clause. 162 The Sixth Circuit applied the
Supreme Court‘s test in Kentucky Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller 163 to
determine whether Michigan‘s rules regulated insurance under ERISA‘s
savings clause. 164 In Miller, the Supreme Court held that state laws must be
specifically directed toward the insurance industry and substantially affect
the risk-pooling arrangement between insurers and insureds to fall within
the savings clause.165 State laws are directed toward the insurance industry
if they regulate ―insurers with respect to their insurance practices.‖166 The
appellate court determined that Michigan‘s rules are specifically directed
toward the insurance industry because they regulate only the rights of
insurers ―to engage in the business of insurance in Michigan.‖ 167 In
addition, Michigan‘s rules substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement
because they change the terms of enforceable contracts and alter ―the scope
of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds.‖168
The insurance industry then argued that ERISA‘s civil enforcement
scheme under § 502 preempts Michigan‘s rules banning discretionary
clauses, even if the rules fall under the savings clause.169 The industry
asserted that ERISA preempted state laws that provide a cause of action for
plan benefits ―outside of, or in addition to, ERISA‘s remedial scheme.‖ 170
The court rejected this argument, finding that Michigan‘s rules do not
conflict with ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions because the rules ―do
not authorize any form of relief in state courts‖ and ―at most may affect the
standard of judicial review.‖ 171 The insurance industry also challenged
Michigan‘s rules on the ground that they conflict with ―ERISA‘s policy of
ensuring a set of uniform rules for adjudicating cases.‖ 172 The Sixth Circuit
rejected this argument as well because ERISA could not preempt a state
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law requiring de novo review as ―the de novo standard of review is already
the default standard in ERISA cases‖ after Firestone.173
Finally, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Glenn supported the holding in Ross that ERISA does not preempt
Michigan‘s law.174 The Glenn Court held that a conflict of interest arising
from an entity‘s dual role as plan administrator and payor of plan benefits is
―but one factor among many‖ that judges must consider in reviewing a
discretionary benefit determination. 175 In light of Glenn‘s holding, the Sixth
Circuit found it ―difficult to understand why a State should not be allowed
to eliminate the potential for such a conflict of interest by prohibiting
discretionary clauses in the first place.‖176
In Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, the Ninth Circuit followed the Sixth
Circuit‘s decision in Ross to uphold Montana‘s ban on discretionary
clauses. 177 The facts in Morrison closely resemble those in Ross. Montana
law required its insurance commissioner to disapprove any insurance form
that contained ―inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clauses . . . which
deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage
of the contract.‖178 Montana‘s Commissioner of Insurance, John Morrison,
interpreted the statute as requiring him to disapprove any insurance contract
that contained a discretionary clause. 179 Accordingly, Commissioner
Morrison denied Standard Insurance Company‘s request for approval of
proposed disability insurance forms that contained discretionary clauses. 180
Standard sued in district court and challenged Morrison‘s practice as
preempted by ERISA. 181 The district court granted summary judgment to
Morrison and Standard appealed. 182
The legal issue on appeal was simply whether ERISA preempted
Commissioner Morrison‘s practice of denying insurance forms with
discretionary clauses.183 Because Morrison‘s practice related to ERISAgoverned employee benefit plans, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
practice is preempted unless it falls under the savings clause pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2).184 The Ninth Circuit applied the two-pronged Miller
test to determine if Morrison‘s disapproval of discretionary clauses came
within the reach of the savings clause. 185 The Ninth Circuit found that
Morrison‘s practice satisfied both requirements and survived ERISA
preemption.186 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit rejected each
of the following five arguments—two in the first prong and three in the
second—raised by Standard.
Standard first argued that Morrison‘s practice of banning discretionary
clauses is not specifically directed toward the insurance industry because it
targets ERISA plans and procedures.187 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, finding instead that ERISA plans are also a form of insurance
and that Morrison‘s practice regulated insurance by limiting the terms that
insurance companies could include in their policies. 188 In its holding, the
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Ninth Circuit expressly agreed with the Sixth Circuit in Ross, which held
that rules imposing conditions on an insurer‘s right to engage in the
business of insurance within a particular state are directed toward the
insurance industry.189
Second, Standard suggested that Commissioner Morrison‘s practice
was still not specifically directed toward the insurance industry because it
―merely applie[d] ‗laws of general application that have some bearing on
insurers.‘‖190 The Ninth Circuit found this argument unpersuasive as well.
The Court observed that Morrison‘s practice of disapproving insurance
forms that contain discretionary clauses is specific to the insurance
industry.191 Moreover, Montana does not require approval of most
contracts, but instead has ―special solicitude for insurance customers‖
because it requires that the Commissioner approve insurance forms in
particular.192 Montana‘s prohibition on discretionary clauses ―addresse[d]
an insurance-specific problem, because discretionary clauses generally do
not exist outside of insurance plans.‖ 193 The Ninth Circuit found Morrison‘s
practice of requiring all insurers to exclude discretionary clauses from their
policies to be ―an application of a special order‖ as opposed to a general
rule.194 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that Morrison‘s disapproval of
discretionary clauses is directed toward the insurance industry and satisfies
the first prong of the Miller test.195
Turning to the second prong of the Miller test, Standard‘s third
contention was that disapproval of discretionary clauses did not
substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between insurers and
insureds.196 Standard asserted that risk pooling occurs when an insurance
contract is made instead of when a claim is made. 197 Consistent with this
definition, risk pooling, claim investigations, the appeals process, and
litigation should fall outside the risk pooling arrangement.198 The Ninth
Circuit rejected Standard‘s argument in favor of a broader notion of risk
pooling.199 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that Morrison‘s practice
changed the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds
because insureds ―may no longer agree to a discretionary clause in
exchange for a more affordable premium.‖ 200 The Court noted that
Montana‘s policy of barring discretionary clauses and ―removing the
benefit of a deferential standard of review from insurers‖ would result in
more claim payouts because insurers would be forced to explain their claim
decisions. 201 The Court also found that Morrison‘s practice affected the risk
pooling arrangement because it altered the terms ―by which the presence or
absence of the insured contingency [was] determined.‖ 202 The Court finally
held that Commissioner Morrison‘s practice of disapproving discretionary
clauses falls under the savings clause and survives ERISA preemption. 203
Fourth, Standard also claimed that Morrison‘s practice interfered with
ERISA‘s exclusive remedial scheme pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).204
ERISA preempts ―‗any state-law cause of action that duplicates,
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supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy.‘‖ 205 The
Ninth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit in Ross, rejected this argument and held
that Morrison‘s practice created no additional remedy outside of ERISA‘s
civil enforcement scheme. 206 The court acknowledged that this practice
would likely lead to de novo review in the federal courts, but found no
conflict with ERISA because de novo had been the default standard of
review since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Firestone.207 The Court thus
distinguished Morrison‘s disapproval of discretionary clauses from ―cases
in which a state attempts to meld a new remedy to the ERISA
framework.‖208
Finally, Standard asserted that Montana‘s bar on discretionary clauses
contravened the purpose and policy behind ERISA of balancing employees‘
right to benefits and incentivizing employers to create benefit plans. 209
Standard relied on the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Glenn, where the Court
retained the Firestone standard of deference instead of requiring de novo
review, and held that courts must treat a fiduciary‘s conflict of interest as
just one factor in deciding whether there is abuse of discretion. 210 The gist
of Standard‘s argument was that the Ninth Circuit likewise ought to refrain
from ―adopting a rule that in practice could bring about near universal
review by judges de novo—i.e. without deference—of a lion‘s share of
ERISA plan claims denials.‖ 211
The Ninth Circuit found that the appropriate test was to balance
ERISA‘s preemption scheme against the state insurance regulation. 212 The
Court noted that the Supreme Court‘s refusal to mandate de novo review
did not necessarily preclude states from issuing insurance regulations that
had such effect.213 Additionally, while the Supreme Court in Firestone and
Glenn endorsed the abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court‘s
acceptance of de novo review as the default nonetheless ―indicates that
highly deferential review is not a cornerstone of the ERISA system.‖214
Recalling the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Rush, where the Court explicitly
stated that it was permissible for states to eliminate a plan administrator‘s
discretion and ability to minimize scrutiny of benefit denials, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Commissioner Morrison‘s practice likewise
prohibited insurers from inserting terms into policies that advantaged the
insurer.215 The Ninth Circuit held that there was no conflict with ERISA
and expressly declined to limit the reach of the savings clause. 216
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged the tension between Commissioner
Morrison‘s practice and the federal common law regarding the appropriate
standard of review in benefits denial cases.217
Finally, the Tenth Circuit recently cited, with approval, the decisions in
Ross and Morrison.218 The court distinguished Ross and Morrison as
inapplicable to the facts at hand but agreed with their reasoning. 219
Verla Hancock participated in an employer-sponsored ERISA-covered
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plan that offered life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment
(AD&D) benefits.220 The plan paid AD&D benefits for loss of life if (1) the
participant was injured in an accident covered under the plan, (2) the
accident was the sole cause of the injury, and (3) death occurred within one
year of the accident.221 However, the plan did not cover injuries resulting
from physical or mental illness. 222 MetLife was the plan‘s insurer and claim
fiduciary, responsible for resolving benefit claims and reviewing appeals. 223
The plan granted MetLife discretion to interpret the plan terms and to
determine eligibility for benefits. 224 In 2003, Utah‘s insurance
commissioner issued Rule 590-218, which prohibited discretionary clauses
in insurance forms relating to an ERISA-covered benefit plan unless ―their
language is ‗substantially similar‘ to the safe-harbor language set forth in
the regulation.‖225 Additionally, Rule 590-218 completely prohibited
discretionary clauses in insurance forms that did not relate to an ERISA
benefit plan. 226
After Hancock died, MetLife approved the claim of her daughter Terri
for life insurance but denied AD&D benefits. 227 MetLife‘s notification
letter explained that Hancock was ineligible for AD&D benefits because
the record failed to establish that Hancock‘s death had been accidental. 228
In 2007, Hancock moved for partial summary judgment in district court on
the standard of review and argued that the court should apply de novo
review to MetLife‘s denial of AD&D benefits. 229 Hancock asserted that
Rule 590-218 deprived MetLife of discretionary authority that would
justify a deferential standard of review. 230 MetLife subsequently moved for
a bench trial and argued that its denial of benefits was ―reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.‖ 231
The district court denied Hancock‘s motion for partial summary
judgment on the ground that ERISA preempted Rule 590-218 and ruled that
MetLife was entitled to deferential review. 232 The district court also denied
Hancock‘s motion for summary judgment because she failed to show that a
covered loss had occurred under the plan.233 Finally, the district court
granted MetLife‘s motion and held that MetLife‘s denial of AD&D benefits
was not arbitrary and capricious. 234
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether Firestone deference
was warranted.235 With regard to the appropriate standard of review, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that this determination rests on whether the
discretionary clause in the plan complies with Utah‘s insurance Rule 590218.236 MetLife argued that ERISA preempts the application of Rule 590218.237 Hancock argued against preemption, but also asserted that even if
the plan‘s discretionary clause were valid, the court must apply less
deference because of MetLife‘s conflict of interest and procedural defects
in MetLife‘s benefit determination. 238
The court of appeals noted that Rule 590-218 permits ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans to include discretionary clauses only if the clause
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language resembles the safe-harbor language under the rule.239 This meant
that Rule 590-218 could apply to an employee benefit plan only if it
survived ERISA preemption. 240 ERISA preempts any state law that relates
to an employee benefit plan unless the law regulates insurance. 241 The
Supreme Court held in Miller that a state law regulates insurance if it is
specifically directed toward the insurance industry and substantially affects
the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured. 242 MetLife did
not dispute that Rule 590-218 satisfied the first prong of the Miller test.243
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit‘s analysis focused on Miller‘s second prong.244
The Tenth Circuit found that ERISA expressly preempted the
application of Rule 590-218 to the plan because ―[t]he rule [did] not
remove the option of insurer discretion from the scope of permissible
insurance bargains in ERISA plans.‖ 245 Instead, the rule permitted
discretionary clauses so long as they conformed to particular wording
requirements.246 As such, the rule had no substantial effect on the risk
pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured. 247 In short, Rule
590-218 failed to satisfy the second prong of the Miller test.248
The Tenth Circuit suggested that the result might have been different
had Rule 590-218 prohibited all discretionary clauses. 249 The Court of
Appeals pointed to the Ross and Morrison decisions as holding that an
absolute bar on discretionary clauses substantially affects risk pooling by
restricting the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and the
insured. 250 Hancock, however, involved no such prohibition on the use of
discretionary clauses and the Tenth Circuit consequently concluded that a
less than complete bar failed the second part of the Miller test.251
Hancock raised several other arguments regarding the effect of Rule
590-218 on the risk pooling arrangement. First, she asserted that Rule 590218 affects the risk pooling arrangement because a failure to conform
substantially to the rule‘s safe-harbor language invalidated a discretionary
clause and deprived the insurer of deferential review by the courts.252 The
Tenth Circuit dismissed Hancock‘s argument as untenable because
noncompliance with any trivial requirement would trigger de novo review
and alter the risk pooling arrangement. 253 The court found that a change in
the risk pooling arrangement must result from compliance with the state
law rather than its violation.254
Second, Hancock asserted that Rule 590-218 limited insurer discretion
because the rule required the language in a discretionary clause to state that
a federal court would determine the appropriate level of deference to a plan
administrator‘s decision.255 The Tenth Circuit correctly noted that this
language merely recognized the extent of the federal courts‘ authority, even
when a plan grants discretionary authority to the administrator, 256 and
recognized that the extent of judicial deference depends on the presence of
conflicts of interest and compliance with procedural requirements instead
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of merely the inclusion of a discretionary clause in the plan terms. 257
The court next considered whether to apply arbitrary and capricious or
de novo review in light of Hancock‘s assertion that MetLife‘s benefit
determination process failed to substantially comply with ERISA
regulations. 258 Specifically, Hancock argued that MetLife‘s benefit
determination was procedurally defective because MetLife‘s denial letters
did not include information required under ERISA and because MetLife did
not provide a full and fair review of her appeal. 259 The appellate court
rejected both contentions. 260 First, it concluded that MetLife‘s denial letters
complied with procedural requirements by stating the reasons and relevant
plan provisions justifying the denial of benefits and by describing the
information Hancock needed to provide in order to perfect her claim. 261 In
addition, the court determined that MetLife had provided Hancock a full
and fair review of her claim because MetLife did not ignore her evidence,
but instead merely found it inconclusive. 262
Finally, the court of appeals noted that prior to Glenn the presence of a
conflict had reduced or withheld deference. 263 Since Glenn rejected burdenshifting rules and held that conflicts of interest are but one factor that a
reviewing court must take into account,264 the court considered MetLife‘s
conflict using Firestone deference, saying MetLife‘s benefit denial needed
only to be sufficiently supported by facts to survive arbitrary and capricious
review. 265 The court of appeals concluded that ―MetLife reasonably
decided that Ms. Hancock failed to prove accidental death.‖ 266 Although
circumstantial evidence indicated that accidental death was a possibility,
the autopsy failed to establish any cause of death at all. 267 MetLife‘s
reliance on official government conclusions proved that its denial of
AD&D benefits had not been arbitrary and capricious.268
B. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND
MEANINGFUL EXTERNAL REVIEW
1. Mechanics
Prior to the PPACA, ERISA had established a process of
internal/external review available to claimants in instances of benefit claims
denial. Very simply, this process required a plan participant to pursue an
internal appeal through the plan‘s administrative review process. 269 After
exhausting the internal appeals procedures a claimant could then pursue a
claim for benefits, typically in federal court.270 Firestone, of course, meant
that this ―external‖ process in federal court was highly deferential to the
decision making process of the plan administrator.
As we have seen, some states confronted Firestone deference head-on
and banned discretionary clauses. In addition, some states enacted their
own external review processes for claims denied by HMOs and insured
plans.271 In order to understand how external review works under the
PPACA, it is critical to recognize the important features of the health
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insurance landscape. First, the PPACA now creates two classes of plans:
those that are grandfathered and not subject to all PPACA provisions, and
those that are fully covered by the new statute. Second, health plans are
either insured or self-insured. Both insured and self-insured plans may be
grandfathered or not.272 Section 1001 of the PPACA 273 refers to the
―consumer protections‖ set forth in the Uniform Health Carrier External
Review Model Act developed by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC)274 and deems these consumer protections the floor
below which an external review process cannot fall. Some states have
adopted the NAIC model act; others have not. Some adopting states have
followed the model act‘s provisions closely; others have not. This means
that there is currently a broad range of external review procedures: some
states have no procedures in place; others have procedures that vaguely
resemble the model act; still others follow the model act closely; others
have adopted the model act verbatim. 275 In response to this varied
landscape, the PPACA ―encourages‖ states to adopt external review
procedures that are consistent with NAIC‘s standards. 276 If a claimant
resides in a state that has no external review or has procedures that do not
conform to the NAIC standards, then that claimant is free to use the federal
external review program. 277
The PPACA external review program is certain to be a jolting change
for self-insured plans that are not grandfathered. Instead of an internal
process (whose outcome is sometimes affected by the plan‘s own financial
stake in the outcome), followed by deferential external review, 278 selfinsured plans now face external review in an explicitly non-deferential
forum that is less likely than a federal court (which is bound by Firestone)
to uphold the plan administrator‘s decision. What is less clear is whether
the NAIC model of external review will somehow manage to identify and
engage truly disinterested reviewers. The pool of board-certified, licensed
physicians who are expert in rare diseases and disorders279 will surely be
limited and one would expect insurers and self-insured plans that have a
significant financial stake in the outcome to come up with creative ways to
game the external review process.
2. Who is Grandfathered?
The PPACA creates a new distinction between plans that were in effect
on March 23, 2010 and those that become effective subsequently. A
grandfathered plan is an insured or self-insured plan that existed on or
before March 23, 2010 and has not taken any steps that cause it to lose
grandfathered status.280 The distinction matters because some provisions of
the PPACA do not apply to grandfathered plans; specifically, grandfathered
plans are exempt from the requirements of the statute regarding
independent, external review.281
Given the importance of grandfathered status, one might expect that
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plans will pay close attention to plan design changes or failures to act that
endanger this status. It is worth noting that maintenance of grandfathered
status comes at an explicit cost of having to observe rules that restrict a
plan‘s ability to change plan terms and cost-sharing arrangements.282 Over
time, and given the upward trajectory of health insurance costs, it is not
unreasonable to expect that plans sponsored by small employers will lose
grandfathered status more rapidly than those sponsored by large employers,
who may be able to withstand upward cost pressure for longer before
succumbing to that pressure and amending the plan. Any plan that loses its
status and is no longer grandfathered will have to comply with the
PPACA‘s requirements for health plans, including the obligation to provide
for independent external review.
Over time, both small and large employers (small quicker than
large) will lose grandfathered status and find themselves subject to all of
the PPACA‘s new requirements. For self-insured plans this will mean a
much less deferential forum in which to resolve disputes about claims. For
insured plans, especially those in states that already have an independent
external review process closely mirroring the NAIC requirements, the
transition should be far less traumatic. What remains to be seen is whether
the NAIC-based model will result in fewer outcomes that are broadly
perceived to be unjust. If it works, this part of Obama Care may mean that
the federal courts will no longer see a large volume of benefit claims
litigation. In the meantime, though, the federal courts of appeal will
continue to operate under Firestone deference—at least to resolve prePPACA cases and those appealed from state or federal external review.
C. FIRESTONE DEFERENCE AND DISTRUST
The twin keys to success of the new PPACA external review process
will be cost and trust. If, at reasonable cost, the process were widely
perceived by the affected parties to be fair and predictable, one would
expect to see a significant drop in appeals to the federal courts. This should
represent a cost savings for both claimants and plans. A perception that the
process is impartial is important. The biggest risk is that insurers will game
the process. Imagining that a certain rare and complicated disease has only
a handful of qualified reviewers, and that each would like to continue to
perform this work for insurers, it is not hard to conceive that the desire to
please the insurer and become a repeat player could compromise a
reviewer‘s work.
The emerging litigation—all pre-PPACA (there have been only three
courts of appeals decisions so far)—over discretionary clauses is
symptomatic of a substantial portion of post-Firestone ERISA common
law. States struggle to find ways to indirectly confront perceived unfairness
by plans and their insurers because ERISA‘s expansive preemption
language expressly prohibits direct measures. 283 The states resort to devices
likely to survive preemption analysis under the savings clause, and
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sometimes this strategy succeeds.284 The core problem, as the Supreme
Court noted in Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, is:
[t]he unhelpful drafting of [the preemption language at 29 U.S.C. §1144
(a) and the Savings Clause at 29 U.S.C. §1144 (b)] occupies a substantial
share of this Court‘s time. In trying to extrapolate intent in a case like this,
when Congressional intent seems simultaneously to preempt everything
and hardly anything, we have no choice but to temper the assumption that
the ordinary meaning . . . accurately expresses the legislative purpose . . . .
Neither state strategies nor the litigation they invariably trigger can be
said to directly encourage any of the oft-stated purposes of the statute: the
encouragement of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity in the
administration of employee benefit plans. 285

Repeatedly, plans and their insurers have suggested that any expansion
of the states‘ role in regulating ERISA plans would prove destructive to the
very consumers the states purport to protect.286 Two arguments routinely
offered by insurers—cost and efficient plan administration—are relevant to
discretionary clauses. The first claim is that any state interference will raise
premiums that are often paid jointly by plan sponsors and employees. 287
Recently, a spokesman for American Health Insurance Plans (AHIP)
asserted that a ban on discretionary clauses ―will result in an increase in
costs.‖288 However, the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) recently noted
that a report by Millman, Inc. commissioned by AHIP in 2005 ―does not
show that insurance costs will face any sort of dramatic increase if
discretionary clauses are prohibited.‖ 289
The second common argument against state interference is that it is
inconsistent with the uniformity Congress hoped would encourage
employers to voluntarily sponsor benefit plans. The claim is that any action
that discourages employers from sponsorship is therefore harmful to current
and future participants. The PPACA, with its NAIC-based standards,
should address the uniformity concern, at least in the long run. As plans
lose their grandfathered status and are forced to justify their adverse
decisions to an independent reviewer, all plans—both insured and selfinsured—should find themselves on a roughly level playing field
irrespective of the state in which they operate.
When asked to comment on the role of discretionary clauses in the
decision to sponsor an ERISA plan, lawyers representing plans noted that
the clauses provide plan administrators with a fast and inexpensive way to
deal with benefits claim litigation when it arises. 290 Banning discretionary
clauses would have significant unintended consequences for patients and
employers. Discretionary clauses give patients consistency and uniformity
in determining the benefits they are eligible for. They also allow employers
to provide more affordable, reliable health care coverage to the
employees.291
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The argument in favor of retaining the Firestone deference model and
preempting discretionary clause bans is essentially that a ban will prove
costly to insurers who, in turn, can be expected to pass these costs on to
employers and participants. Although it lacks significant empirical
support,292 this argument is not a trivial one. As the recent national
discussion about how to provide health insurance for the approximately
47,000,000 uninsured293 illustrates, cost is an extremely important part of
the equation. What the argument does not address, however, is the primary
concern of the states and plaintiffs in benefits claims cases: substantial
evidence294 that the arbitrary and capricious standard emboldens some
insurers, especially those in Glenn295-type conflicts, to deny meritorious
claims. Hopefully, the PPACA process will go some distance toward
addressing this issue. Even if it does, some dissatisfied claimants will no
doubt proceed to federal court. A truly impartial independent review
process should make it easy to dispose of most of these cases by employing
Firestone deference.
For now, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits seem willing to risk premium
increases and other costs in order to rectify some of the imbalance between
insurers and participants. The Tenth Circuit has indicated that it agrees with
the conclusion that complete bans are not preempted by ERISA. 296
Although it is conceivable that all the federal circuits will adopt the
position of Ross297 and Morrison, 298 complete uniformity among the federal
courts of appeal in ERISA matters is not common. 299 Should a conflict
arise, or even in the odd absence of a conflict, it is hard to believe that the
Supreme Court would allow more than twenty years of Firestone deference
to disappear easily.
In Conkright v. Frommert300 the majority gave no hint that it was
concerned with the affects of the now commonplace arbitrary and
capricious standard on participants‘ ability to obtain contractually promised
benefits. On the contrary, Justice Roberts explained:
Congress sought ―to create a system that is [not] so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers
from offering [ERISA] plans in the first place.‖ ERISA induc[es]
employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of liabilities,
under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of
ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred.
Firestone deference protects those interests and, by permitting an
employer to grant primary interpretive authority over an ERISA plan to
the plan administrator, preserves the ―careful balancing‖ on which ERISA
is based. Deference promotes efficiency by encouraging resolution of
benefits disputes through internal administrative proceedings, rather than
costly litigation. It also promotes predictability, as an employer can rely
on the expertise of the plan administrator rather than worry about
unexpected and inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de
novo judicial review. Moreover, Firestone deference serves the interest of
uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork of different interpretations of a
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plan, like the one here, that covers employees in different jurisdictions—a
result that ―would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce
benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.‖ 301

The open empirical question is how a ban on discretionary clauses
would affect an employer‘s decision of whether to sponsor a plan. What is
certain, though, is that some insurers take advantage of the deference they
enjoy under the arbitrary and capricious standard and deny claims that
might well have been paid following de novo review.
The central dilemma in discretionary clause cases is what to do about
the atmosphere of profound distrust in which all parties must operate.
Insurers worry (sometimes with justification) 302 that they are bombarded by
fraudulent claims brought by ignorant or unscrupulous plan participants.
Deferential review reduces insurer anxiety, of course, and insulates the
judgment of the plan administrator under most circumstances. Deferential
review is also clearly the preferred standard for a financially conflicted
insurer like MetLife in Glenn.303
Claimants worry (sometimes with justification) that financial
considerations—and not contract of adhesion-based promises—dominate
the evaluation of their claim. Instead of an impartial review, claimants and
their advocates anticipate a profit-conscious process like the one described
by Professor Langbein. 304 Understandably, they are typically anxious to
receive the benefits for which they contracted, especially in cases involving
disability, severe illness and loss of employment.
The only way forward that respects the financial concerns of insurers
and the legitimate expectations of participants in an atmosphere pervaded
by distrust is the creation of a truly impartial third party who can be
counted on to review claims without conflict. Some will remember that a
few years ago Senator John McCain and others305 proposed allowing a
claimant to appeal to an independent, non-insurer affiliated board for de
novo review. The PPACA is arguably the result of that effort, although
perhaps not exactly what the Senator had in mind. At the time, some of the
details elicited criticism, 306 but the basic intuition was sound. The new
interim regulations create a more complicated system in which the quality
of external review will depend largely upon the ability of a plan sponsor to
hold onto grandfathered status. Years of Firestone deference have
demonstrated that what insurers and claimants need is an impartial,
independent, inexpensive, and efficient process that refuses to focus on the
financial concerns of often conflicted insurers to the exclusion of explicit
promises made to the claimant. Ordinarily, de novo review in federal court
would meet all of these requirements, except perhaps efficiency and low
cost. A model akin to an arbitration panel, 307 with complete independence
from industry associations, would come closer to the ideal. Irrespective of
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the details, the goal should be a regime in which insurers know what their
costs will be because they routinely pay all legitimate claims in full and in a
manner consistent with promises made via employer-sponsored contracts of
adhesion.
CONCLUSION
The formal state of the law on discretionary clauses in ERISA-governed
employee benefit plans has undergone little shift in the last two decades. In
Firestone, the Supreme Court held that federal courts must apply de novo
review to an adverse benefit determination, unless the plan grants the
administrator discretionary authority to interpret plan terms and make
benefit decisions. The existence of a discretionary clause in a plan triggers
a deferential standard of review unless the court finds a clear abuse of
discretion by the administrator. Firestone has triggered criticism because of
a perception that discretionary clauses weaken ERISA‘s goal of protecting
the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. However, as the fairly
recent decisions in Glenn and Conkright demonstrate, the Supreme Court
remains attached to Firestone deference.
In the last few years, states have undertaken efforts to limit
discretionary clauses. Today, approximately twelve states prohibit
discretionary clauses in insurance policies and several others limit the use
of such clauses.308 The insurance industry has begun to challenge these
state efforts to ban discretionary clauses on ERISA preemption grounds. A
handful of courts of appeals have reached a consensus that state rules
barring discretionary clauses survive ERISA preemption because they
regulate insurance and consequently fall under ERISA‘s savings clause.
Only the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have thus far considered cases
challenging state bans on discretionary clauses. Notably, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Standard Insurance Co. v. Morrison, the Ninth
Circuit case that uphold Montana‘s ban on discretionary clauses. One likely
reason for the denial of certiorari is the lack of a circuit split on the issue of
whether ERISA preempts laws that prohibit discretionary clauses. 309 It may
well be that the importance of discretionary clauses will decline if the hard
cases are resolved by an external reviewer. If external review never gains
the confidence of plans and participants, though, the bans on discretionary
clauses could continue to be an important part of the calculus in benefits
claim cases.
State efforts to proscribe discretionary clauses undeniably provide more
protection to plan participants and beneficiaries because administrators can
no longer expect courts to defer to their benefit decisions. As the Sixth
Circuit explained in Ross, the effect of state rules barring discretionary
clauses may be to mandate de novo review by the courts.310 On the other
hand, it remains unclear how employers will react to an increase in
regulatory pressure from the states. Chief Justice Roberts argued in Glenn
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that judicial deference to a fiduciary‘s discretionary authority ―encourages
employers to provide medical and retirement benefits to their employees
through ERISA-governed plans—something they are not required to do.‖311
Therefore, while plan participants and beneficiaries may be better off in the
short term as a result of limits on discretionary clauses, the long-term effect
on plan creation is more difficult to ascertain. The latest rulings coming out
of the circuit courts of appeals have generally dismissed such concerns in
favor of protecting individual interests in employee benefits. Ideally, the
creation of an efficient and impartial forum for review of benefit claims
denials, like that called for in the PPACA, would reassure claimants that
legitimate claims were indeed being paid, while saving cost-conscious
employers and insurers from lengthy and expensive federal litigation. The
Supreme Court‘s attachment to Firestone deference seems certain to collide
with the decisions in Ross and Morrison. Nonetheless, states will
presumably look to the adoption of outright bans in order to rectify the
unfairness that Firestone deference could continue to create for plan
participants and beneficiaries.
1

489 U.S. 101 (1989).
Id. at 108–09 (―Although it is a ‗comprehensive and reticulated statute,‘ Nachman Corp.
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980), ERISA does not set out the
appropriate standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit
eligibility determinations.‖).
3
Id. at 115 (italics added) (―As this case aptly demonstrates, the validity of a claim to
benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at
issue. Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that a denial of benefits
challenged under 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.‖).
4
D. Andrew Portinga, OFIS Bans Discretionary Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1 J. INS. &
INDEM. L. 1, 11 (2008) (―After Firestone, insurers commonly inserted discretionary
clauses into ERISA-regulated policies. These clauses limit a federal court‘s review of an
insurer‘s decision to deny benefits in ERISA cases. That is, under ERISA, if an insurer is
granted discretion to determine a person‘s eligibility for benefits, a court may only
overturn that decision if the decision is arbitrary and capricious.‖).
5
See Besser v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 07-00437, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116869,
at *2 (D. Haw. Sept. 30, 2008) (applying de novo review because the insurer failed to
demonstrate that the ERISA plan documents unambiguously gave the insurer discretion to
interpret the insurance policy); McCoy v. Fed. Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1141 (E.D.
Wash. 1998) (applying de novo review because the plan did not clearly give the
administrator discretion to determine benefit eligibility and interpret the plan terms);
Davidson v. St. Francis Reg‘l Med. Ctr. Employee Group Health Plan, 715 F. Supp. 1038,
1039 (D. Kan. 1989) (applying de novo review because the plan gave the administrator no
discretion to determine benefit eligibility and construe the plan terms); see also Hug v.
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., No. 98-5047 (DRD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19942, at *21–22
(D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2006) (applying de novo review to a benefit denial because a ―vague and
2
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ambiguous‖ reference in the plan to the claim approval process could not be construed as a
grant of discretionary authority); Sorel v. CIGNA, No. 94-089-JD, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8886, at *9 (D.N.H. June 15, 1995) (refusing to apply arbitrary and capricious review to
the denial of benefits because the plan‘s discretionary clause limited the administrator‘s
authority to determining only when benefits start and not when benefits terminate).
6
The AARP‘s Mary Ellen Signorille, a well-respected ERISA litigator, notes: ―For some
participants this [the existence of a discretionary clause] literally could be the difference
between life and death in the health context or economic devastation in the disability and
pension context.‖ Jo-el J. Meyer, States Beef Up Bans on ―Discretionary Clauses‖ as
Courts Rule Out ERISA Hurdle, 37 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 377 (Feb. 16, 2010). Mark
DeBofsky has also noted that ―[t]he presence of discretionary clauses means that a benefit
claimant needs to prove the insurer‘s decision was ‗unreasonable, and not merely
incorrect.‘‖ Discretionary Clauses and Insurance, 25 J. INS. REG. 15 (2006) (quoting
Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F. 2d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2000)).
7
See John Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and
Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324 (2007)
(arguing that the deferential standard of review made it easier to deny benefits in bad faith
because courts must sustain a benefit denial unless the victim can produce evidence that
the plan‘s decision was unreasonable); see also Brigham v. Sun Life of Can., 317 F.3d 72,
85 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that Sun Life‘s denial of long-term disability benefits to a
paraplegic plaintiff suffering from muscle strain, pain, and limited bodily function was not
arbitrary and capricious because Sun-Life made a reasonable determination; and
acknowledging the difficulty faced by the plaintiff in attempting to prove he was totally
disabled); Nance v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 294 F.3d 1263, 1269–75 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Sun Life‘s denial of long-term disability benefits to a plaintiff suffering from
back pain and depression was not arbitrary and capricious because Sun Life reasonably
determined that plaintiff‘s conditions were not disabling prior to his termination from
employment; and acknowledging that this standard is a ―difficult one for a claimant to
overcome‖).
8
At present, 22 states have or are in the process of limiting or banning outright the use of
discretionary clauses. Meyer, supra note 6.
9
ERISA § 514(a) preempts all state laws that relate to an ERISA-governed employee
benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). Section 514(b)(2)(A), known as the savings
clause, exempts state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities from ERISA‘s
preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006). However, § 514(b)(2)(B), known as the
deemer clause, provides that no employee benefit plan shall be deemed to be an insurance
company within the meaning of the savings clause for the purpose of avoiding ERISA
preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006). See Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590
F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2009) (―The question is whether the [discretionary] clause is
valid. Ms. Hancock contends that it is invalid because it fails to comply with Utah‘s
insurance Rule 590-218; therefore, she reasons, MetLife lacks discretionary authority and
its decision must be reviewed de novo. MetLife counters, however, that ERISA expressly
preempts the application of the rule in this case.‖); Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d
837, 841 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Standard Insurance Company (‗Standard‘) duly applied to
[Montana‘s insurance commissioner] Morrison for approval of its proposed disability
insurance forms which contained discretionary clauses; Morrison denied the request.
Standard responded by suing in district court, arguing that the subject is preempted by
ERISA. The district court granted the Commissioner summary judgment, and Standard
timely appeals.‖); Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2009)
(―Following discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment, with the Insurance
Industry arguing, inter alia, that (1) the rules are preempted by ERISA because they
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interfere with that statute‘s objectives, and (2) the rules do not fall within the ambit of
ERISA‘s savings clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The district court rejected each of
these arguments, granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. We review
the district court‘s grant of summary judgment on the issue of ERISA preemption de
novo.‖).
10
For examples of other attempts by the states to regulate around ERISA, see Aetna
Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempted a Texas state
law which allowed claimants to recover damages when an HMO failed to exercise
ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S.
141, 150 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempted a Washington state law that revoked the
designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset upon the dissolution of
marriage because the law directly conflicted with ERISA‘s requirement that plans be
administered and benefits be paid in accordance with plan documents); De Buono v.
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997) (holding that ERISA
did not preempt a New York state law that imposed a tax on medical centers operated by
ERISA plans because the law merely burdened the plans‘ administration and therefore did
not ―relate to‖ them within the meaning of ERISA); Cal. Div. of Labor Stds. Enforcement
v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (holding that ERISA did not
preempt a California state law that required contractors on public projects to pay all of
their workers the prevailing wage except those workers participating in a state-approved
apprenticeship program because the law merely altered the incentives without dictating the
choices facing ERISA plans); New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt a New
York state law that imposed surcharges on hospital bills that were paid by commercial
insurance or HMO coverage purchased through an ERISA plan because the law produced
only indirect economic effects on ERISA plans and therefore did not ―relate to‖ them
within the meaning of ERISA); Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.
125, 126 (1992) (holding that ERISA preempted a section of a D.C. law which required an
employer who provides health coverage to an employee to provide the same level of health
coverage to an injured employee who is eligible for worker‘s compensation benefits);
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64–65 (1990) (holding that ERISA preempted a
Pennsylvania antisubrogation law from applying to self-funded ERISA plans); Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 108 (1983) (holding that ERISA preempted New York‘s
Human Rights Law to the extent that the law prohibited employment practices that were
then lawful under federal law, such as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in
employee benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 526 (1981)
(holding that ERISA preempted a New Jersey state law which prohibited offsets of
pension benefits by the amount of workers‘ compensation awards); Hancock v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that ERISA preempted a
Utah state rule which governed discretionary clauses in ERISA-governed employee benefit
plans); Golden Gate Rest. Ass‘n v. City & County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 661
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that ERISA did not preempt the San Francisco Health Care
Security Ordinance that imposed healthcare spending requirements on employers because
those requirements did not ―establish‖ an ERISA plan or have an impermissible
connection with or reference to such plans); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass‘n v. Fielder, 475
F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA preempted Maryland‘s Fair Share
Health Care Fund Act which required employers with 10,000 or more employees to spend
at least 8% of their payroll on employees‘ health insurance or pay the amount of their
shortfall to the State of Maryland); Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v.
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Minn. Dep‘t of Pub. Safety, 267 F.3d 807, 819–20 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that ERISA
preempted parts of the Minnesota Sprinkler Fitter Licensing Law and rules that mandated
the standards for an approved apprenticeship program but offered no choice of compliance
with either state and federal standards); Am. Med. Sec. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 360 (4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA preempted a Maryland insurance regulation which
required self-funded ERISA plans to provide state-mandated health benefits when they
purchase certain types of stop-loss insurance); Plumbing Indus. Bd. v. E.W. Howell Co.,
126 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA preempted a New York lien law
which required a general contractor to assume responsibility for a sub-contractoremployer‘s failure to cover his benefit obligations and thus impermissibly added to the
exclusive list of parties responsible for an employer‘s benefit obligations under ERISA);
Air Transp. Ass‘n of Am. V. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1155
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that ERISA preempted a San Francisco city ordinance which
prohibited the city from contracting with companies whose employee benefit plans
discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic partners);
Fixx v. United Mine Workers, 645 F. Supp. 352, 355 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (holding that
ERISA preempted a section of a West Virginia law that prohibited employers who
provided any type of medical insurance from reducing or canceling such benefits while an
employee was on temporary total disability).
11
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–48, 124 Stat. 119.
12
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–52, 124 Stat.
1024.
13
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,331 (July 23, 2010).
14
Id. at 43,330; Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers
Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act; Preexisting Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and
Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188 (June 28, 2010); Interim Final Rules for Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health
Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538 (June 17,
2010); Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating
to Dependent Coverage of Children to Age 26 Under the Patient Protection Affordable
Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,122 (May 13, 2010).
15
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,539 (June 17, 2010).
16
Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, § 1251; as of this writing, the
government has also exempted some non-grandfathered from certain provisions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Certain health insurance plans and
issuers can now obtain waivers from the minimum annual limit requirements under the
PPACA through the Health and Human Services Office of Consumer Information and
Insurance Oversight. OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, OCIIO SUBREGULATORY GUIDANCE (OCIIO 2010–1): PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WAIVERS OF THE
ANNUAL LIMITS REQUIREMENTS OF PHS ACT SECTION 2711 (2010). The Secretary of
Health and Human Services‘ waiver authority was provided for in the interim final rules
relating to annual limits. Requirements for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Relating to Preexisting
Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections,
75 Fed. Reg. 37,188, 37,230 (June 28, 2010).
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The interim final rules state: ―[d](3) Waiver authority of the Secretary. For plan years
(or in the individual market, policy years) beginning before January 1, 2014, the Secretary
may establish a program under which the requirements of paragraph (d)(1) of this section
relating to annual limits may be waived (for such period as is specified by the Secretary)
for a group health plan or health insurance coverage that has an annual dollar limit on
benefits below the restricted annual limits provided under paragraph (d)(1) of this section
if compliance with paragraph (d)(1) of this section would result in a significant decrease in
access to benefits under the plan or health insurance coverage or would significantly
increase premiums for the plan or health insurance coverage.‖ Id.
Section (d)(1) in the interim final rules allows group health plans or health insurance
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage, with respect to plan years
beginning after September 23, 2010 and before January 1, 2014, to establish for any
individual an annual limit on the dollar amount of benefits, which are ―essential health
benefits‖ under section 1302(b) of the PPACA and applicable regulations, as long as the
limit does not fall below the amounts specified in the interim final rules. Id. Therefore, the
Secretary‘s waiver authority constitutes an exception to Section (d)(1). For plan or policy
years beginning on or after January 1, 2014, however, no annual limits will be permitted
except in grandfathered plans. Id. at 37, 191.
The interim final rules also provided that ―Guidance from the Secretary of Health and
Human Services regarding the scope and process for applying for a waiver is expected to
be issued in the near future.‖ Id. On September 3, 2010, the Health and Human Services
Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight issued a Bulletin which clarified
that the waiver process was contemplated largely within the context of ―limited benefit‖ or
―mini-med‖ plans that have annual limits well below the restricted annual limits set out in
the regulations and would have trouble complying with the requirements of Section (d)(1).
Regardless of the PPACA and the regulations, the low annual limits for these plans would
stay in place pursuant to a waiver. Since waivers are issued on a one-year basis, group
health plans and health insurance issuers have to reapply for a waiver for each subsequent
plan or policy year prior to January 1, 2014, when the waiver practice is set to expire.
OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, OCIIO SUB-REGULATORY GUIDANCE
(OCIIO 2010–1): PROCESS FOR OBTAINING WAIVERS OF THE ANNUAL LIMITS
REQUIREMENTS OF PHS ACT SECTION 2711 (2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/
patient/ociio_2010-1_20100903_508.pdf.
The New York Times reported in October 2010 that the Obama administration had
granted at least 30 waivers. Reed Abelson, Waivers Aim at Talk of Dropping Health
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at B1. The most recent statistic from the Department
of Health and Human Services states that 222 waivers have been granted as of December
3, 2010. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Approved Applications for
Waiver of the Annual Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 as of December
3, 2010, http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html.
The HHS Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight issued another
clarification of the waiver process in a Bulletin on November 5, 2010. First, group health
plans and health insurance issuers who obtain a waiver will have to notify their
participants that their plan or policy does not meet the restricted annual limits for essential
benefits which are set out in the Interim Final Rules (IFR), and that the plan or issuer has
received a waiver of that requirement. Second, in order for issuers to be able to comply
with state laws that require, issuers to offer policies with annual limits that are below the
minimum requirements established in the Interim Final Rules, a state can now apply for a
waiver of the restricted annual limits ―on behalf of issuers of state-mandated policies in the
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state if state law required the policies to be offered by the issuers prior to September 23,
2010. Although the state may apply on the issuers‘ behalf, the application must still satisfy
the standard established in the IFR that compliance by the issuers would result in a
‗significant decrease in access to benefits‘ or a ‗significant increase in premiums.‘‖ Any
state waiver applications will be effective retroactively to September 23, 2010. OFFICE OF
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, OCIIO SUB-REGULATORY GUIDANCE (OCIIO
2010—1A) SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE (2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/1105-2010annual_limits_waiver_bulletin.pdf.
Finally, certain plans that were granted waivers of the annual limits requirements have
also requested an exemption from the PPACA‘s medical loss ratio (―MLR‖) provisions.
These provisions, which are found in Section 2718 to the Public Health Service Act
(PHSA), require issuers of group and individual coverage to submit annual reports to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services about the percentage of premiums that the issuer
spends on reimbursement for clinical services or improving health care, if the amount of
spending doesn‘t meet the minimal standards for a particular plan year. The MLR
requirement will go into effect on January 1, 2011. Mini-med plans have expressed
concern about meeting this requirement and the Secretary is expected to issue regulations
implementing the MLR provisions and taking into account the special circumstances of
mini-med plans. Id.
17
Grandfathered health plan coverage applies to coverage provided by group health plans
or health insurance issuers in which an individual was enrolled as of the PPACA‘s
enactment on March 23, 2010. The regulations provide that a plan cannot lose
grandfathered status as long as it has covered someone continuously since March 23, 2010,
even if all the other individuals who were enrolled in the plan on that date cease to be
covered. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage
Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,562 (June 17, 2010).
The regulations prescribe detailed rules on how to maintain grandfathered status.
Health plans are required to disclose their grandfathered status to plan participants and
beneficiaries in a written statement or risk losing such status. Additionally, health plans
must retain records which state the plan terms and any other documents that are necessary
to verify their status as grandfathered plans. Failure to comply with the recordkeeping
requirements outlined in the interim final regulations causes plans to lose their
grandfathered status. Next, a plan ceases to be a grandfathered health plan if the purpose of
a merger or acquisition is to cover new individuals under the plan. Furthermore, a plan
loses its grandfathered status if employees are transferred into the plan or health insurance
from a plan that they were covered under on March 23, 2010; if the transferee plan were
treated as an amendment of the transferor plan; and if there was no ―bona fide
employment-based reason‖ to transfer the employees into the transferee plan. Id. at 34,
562–65.
Collectively bargained plans are also subject to the requirements outlined in the
interim final regulations regarding the maintenance of grandfather status. Such plans
remain grandfathered at least until the date when the last collective bargaining agreement,
which was in effect on March 23, 2010, terminates. Moreover, group plans or health
insurance coverage cease to be grandfathered if they eliminate all or substantially all
benefits which are required to diagnose or treat a condition; if there is an increase in
percentage cost-sharing requirements, such as coinsurance; if there is an increase in fixedamount cost-sharing requirements other than a co-payment, such as a deductible, which
exceeds the maximum percentage increases as defined in the regulations; and finally, if
there is an increase in the fixed-amount co-payment which is equal to $5 increased by
medical inflation or exceeds the maximum percentage increase. A grandfathered plan also
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loses its status if the employer or employee organization decreases its contribution rate by
more than 5 percentage points below the contribution rate for the period that covered
March 23, 2010, whether the reduction is based on cost of coverage or a formula employed
by the plan. Id.
Recently, an amendment to the regulations concerning grandfathered group health
plans and health insurance issuers has introduced the following changes. A group health
plan or any health insurance coverage offered in connection with the group health plan
does not cease to have grandfathered status if the plan or its sponsor enters into a new
policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 that is effective on or after
November 15, 2010, provided that the plan remains in compliance with the other
requirements for grandfathered plans. Amendment to the Interim Final Rules for Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health
Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,114, 70,116
(Nov. 17, 2010). However, the amendment does not apply retroactively and if a group
health plan or its sponsor enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after
March 23, 2010 that is effective before November 15, 2010, the plan loses its
grandfathered status. Id. at 70,121. Additionally, a group health plan that changes its
insurance coverage must provide to the new health insurance issuer documentation of plan
terms under its prior health coverage sufficient to determine whether a change causing a
loss of grandfathered status has occurred. Id. In contrast to group health plans, when health
insurance coverage is provided in the individual market, a change in issuers would be
considered a change in the health insurance coverage in which the individual was enrolled
on March 23, 2010, and the new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance would not be a
grandfathered health plan. Id. at 70,116.
18
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,354–58 (July 23, 2010).
19
See, e.g., the detailed description of the pre-litigation record in Holmstrom v. Met. Life
Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16123, at *3–17 (7th Cir. 2010).
20
See discussion of Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, infra at Section II.B.
21
A State external review can take place following either an initial or final benefit denial
pursuant to internal claims and appeals procedures. In the event that the State external
review process requires exhaustion of internal procedures, such a requirement must not
apply if the plan or issuer has waived it; if the plan or issuer is deemed to have exhausted
the internal claims and appeals procedures under applicable law (such as by failing to
comply with the standards for internal review outlined in the regulations); or if the
claimant has applied for expedited external review at the same as applying for an
expedited internal appeal. Additionally, the State external review must be based on the
plan or issuer‘s requirements for ―medical necessity, appropriateness, health care setting,
level of care, or effectiveness of a covered benefit.‖ Interim Final Rules for Group Health
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External
Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at
43,356 (July 23, 2010).
22
Id. at 43,357.
23
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
24
Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359–61 (2002) (―Section 4-10 of
Illinois‘s Health Maintenance Organization Act, 215 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 125, § 4-10
(2000), provides recipients of health coverage by such organizations with a right to
independent medical review of certain denials of benefits. . . . [The Illinois HMO Act
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provides that] ‗[e]ach Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the
timely review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary care
physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance Organization, jointly selected
by the patient . . . primary care physician and the Health Maintenance Organization in the
event of a dispute between the primary care physician and the Health Maintenance
Organization regarding the medical necessity of a covered service proposed by a primary
care physician. In the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to
be medically necessary, the Health Maintenance Organization shall provide the covered
service.‘‖).
25
See supra note 23; see also Rush, 536 U.S. 355.
26
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 127 (2005) (―A showing of a
conflict in decisions of the courts of appeals . . . is likely to weigh strongly with the Court
as a factor favoring review . . . .‖); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567, 1569 (2008) (stating that the Justices‘ concern with ensuring uniformity and
resolving circuit splits drive the case selection process at the U.S. Supreme Court and
account for seventy percent of the Court‘s docket).
27
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,354–58 (July 23, 2010).
28
See Langbein, supra note 7.
29
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
30
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
31
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
32
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
33
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
34
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006).
35
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002).
36
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006).
37
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
38
29 U.S.C. § 1133(2) (2006).
39
See D. Andrew Portinga, OFIS Bans Discretionary Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1 J.
INS. & INDEM. L. 1, 11 (2008); Henry Quillen, State Prohibition of Discretionary Clauses
in ERISA-Covered Benefit Plans, 32 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 67, 69 (2006).
40
John Langbein, supra note 7, at 1316.
41
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 115.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Langbein, supra note 7, at 1326.
49
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
50
Langbein, supra note 7, at 1324; Beverly Cohen, Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v.
Glenn Standard Discounts ERISA Fiduciaries‘ Conflict of Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
955, 960 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Firestone allowed plan
fiduciaries to determine claims ―in a way that better controlled the costs of their employee
benefit plans, as they could construe plan terms to promote cost efficiency and would be
subject to reversal by a court only if their interpretations were arbitrary and capricious‖);
John Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 222 (1990)
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(criticizing Firestone on the grounds that, ―If the purpose of ERISA fiduciary law is to
protect plan participants from abusive management by the plan fiduciary, it seems
transparently counterproductive to allow the employer to bootstrap around the safe-guards
of the statute by inserting boilerplates in the plans ordering the courts not to pay much
attention to the misbehavior of an employer-dominated fiduciary.‖).
51
Mark DeBofsky, Discretionary Clauses and Insurance, 25 J. INS. REG. 15, 15 (2006).
52
Id. (quoting Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 2000)).
53
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 363 (2002).
54
Id. at 359
55
Id. at 360.
56
Id. at 359–60.
57
Id. at 359
58
Id. at 361.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 360.
61
Id. at 362–63.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 363.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 387.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 385, n. 16.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 386–87.
70
Id. at 15.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 385.
73
Id. at 386.
74
The Supreme Court‘s failure to clarify the extent of judicial deference in cases where a
plan administrator is conflicted and also enjoys Firestone deference resulted in a variety of
approaches to this issue in the Courts of Appeals. See Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d
154 (3d Cir. 2007) (applying a sliding scale approach whereby the existence of a conflict
of interest mandates a heightened form of arbitrary and capricious review); Rud v. Liberty
Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no conflict of interest
despite the insurer‘s role as plan administrator and payor of benefits, and applying the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
75
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108–09 (2008).
76
Id. at 109.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 109.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31a, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008)
(No. 06-923) (―MetLife then reevaluated plaintiff‘s claim and concluded that benefits were
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not payable after September 16, 2002. Plaintiff was advised of this decision in a four-page
letter dated August 28, 2002. AR 66–69. In this letter, MetLife noted that Dr. Patel
previously found that plaintiff was able to work; that plaintiff‘s medical records supported
the conclusion that plaintiff‘s condition was stable and plaintiff was able to perform
fulltime sedentary work.‖).
87
Metro., 554 U.S. at 109.
88
Id.
89
Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2006), aff‘d 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (―In this
case, the district court appropriately reviewed the record under the ―arbitrary and
capricious‖ standard, because the plan at issue granted the plan administrator discretionary
authority to interpret the terms of the plan and to determine benefits. . . . Indeed, the
plaintiff conceded that review for arbitrariness was the correct standard of review here‖).
90
Metro., 554 U.S. at 110.
91
Glenn v. MetLife, 461 F.3d at 674 (―[W]e conclude that MetLife‘s decision to deny
long-term benefits in this case was not the product of a principled and deliberative
reasoning process. MetLife acted under a conflict of interest and also in unacknowledged
conflict with the determination of disability by the Social Security Administration. In
denying benefits, it offered no explanation for crediting a brief form filled out by Dr. Patel
while overlooking his detailed reports. This inappropriately selective consideration of
Glenn‘s medical record was compounded by the fact that the occupational skills analyst
and the independent medical consultant were apparently not provided with full information
from Dr. Patel on which to base their conclusions. Moreover, there was no adequate basis
for the plan administrator‘s decision not to factor in one of the major consideration in
Glenn‘s pathology, that of the role that stress played in aggravating her condition and, in
the language of the MetLife policy, in preventing her return to ‗gainful work or service for
which [she is] reasonably qualified taking into consideration [her] training, education,
experience, and past earning.‘ Taken together, these factors reflect a decision by MetLife
that can only be described as arbitrary and capricious.‖).
92
Metro., 554 U.S. at 110.
93
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (No. 06-923) (―If an administrator that both
determines and pays claims under an ERISA plan is deemed to be operating under a
conflict of interest, how should that conflict be taken into account on judicial review of a
discretionary benefit determination.‖).
94
Metro., 554 U.S. at 110.
95
Id. at 111.
96
Id. at 112.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. (―[W]here it is the employer that both funds the plan and evaluates the claims . . .
[t]he employer‘s fiduciary interest may counsel in favor of granting a borderline claim
while its immediate financial interest counsels to the contrary. Thus, the employer has an
‗interest . . . conflicting with that of the beneficiaries,‘ the type of conflict that judges must
take into account when they review the discretionary acts of a trustee of a common-law
trust.‖).
100
Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008)
(No. 06-923) (―The dual-role conflict that everybody knows exists . . . was absolutely
intended on‖); Brief for Petitioners at 23, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105
(2008) (No. 06-923) (―Under traditional trust-law principles, trustees may serve in settings
where their decisions could potentially further their own interests, as long as that
arrangement is contemplated in the trust documents.‖).
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Metro., 554 U.S. at 112.
Id. at 113.
103
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008)
(No. 06-923) (―ERISA‘s text, structure, and purpose establish that entities that both
evaluate and pay benefit claims do not, without more, operate under a conflict of interest
that must be weighed on judicial review. In an effort to circumvent the clear implications
of these interpretive guideposts, respondent and the United States marginalize ERISA‘s
statutory text, invoke irrelevant trust-law principles that post-date ERISA‘s enactment, and
adopt a restrictive view of ERISA‘s statutory objectives.‖).
104
Brief for Petitioners at 28–29, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (No.
06-923) (―ERISA reflects Congress‘s ‗desire not to create a system that is so complex that
. . . litigation expenses[] unduly discourage employers from offering welfare benefit
plans.‘ . . . Indeed, ERISA seeks to facilitate cost-effective dispute resolution through
internal administrative review rather than litigation. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2); 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1(h)(1). Increasing the litigation burdens on ERISA plans will drain their limited
financial resources and discourage employers from establishing benefit plans-to the
substantial detriment of existing and prospective plan participants and beneficiaries. This
Court should not lightly rewrite the deferential standard that the plan settlor envisioned
when it delegated discretionary authority to the claim fiduciary, solely on the basis of a
potential conflict that was also contemplated by the plan, and thus invite wasteful litigation
that can only diminish the assets that are ultimately available to provide and fund
benefits.‖).
105
Metro., 554 U.S. at 113 (―MetLife adds that to find a conflict here is inconsistent . . .
with an ERISA provision specifically allowing employers to administer their own plans,
see 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).‖).
106
Id. at 114.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 114–15.
109
Id. at 114 (The Supreme Court noted that ―the employer‘s own conflict may extend to
its selection of an insurance company to administer its plan. An employer choosing an
administrator in effect buys insurance for others and consequently (when compared to the
marketplace customer who buys for himself) may be more interested in an insurance
company with low rates than in one with accurate claims processing.‖ The Court correctly
observed that a conflict of interest may be no less obvious in the case of an employer who
uses a third-party administrator than in the case of a self-insuring employer).
110
Metro., 554 U.S. at 115.
111
Id. (The Supreme Court elaborated that a legal rule which requires courts to consider a
conflict of interest as a factor in their analysis of a benefit denial also permits them to take
account of the full range of facts and circumstances that diminish ―the significance or
severity of the conflict in individual cases.‖).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Metro., 554 U.S. at 115.
115
Id. (―[W]e elucidate what this Court set forth in Firestone, namely, that a conflict
should ‗be weighed as a ‗factor in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.‘‖).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 116.
102
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Metro., 554 U.S. at 116 (―Had Congress intended such a system of review, we believe it
would not have left to the courts the development of review standards but would have said
more on the subject.‖). The PPACA is now, arguably, the expression of explicit
Congressional intent or guidance the Court has been waiting for.
121
Id.; The Supreme Court‘s decision in Glenn effectively overturned the Third Circuit‘s
sliding scale approach requiring courts to apply a heightened arbitrary and capricious
standard when plan administrators operate under a conflict of interest. See Goletz v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11501, at *8 (3d Cir. June 7, 2010)
(―We had previously applied a heightened form of arbitrary and capricious review for
those cases in which an administrator acts under a conflict of interest, using a ―sliding
scale‖ approach to address how much deference should properly be afforded to a
conflicted administrator‘s determination. See Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 161
(3d Cir. 2007). However, in the wake of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 554
U.S. 105 (2008) (―Met Life‖), our sliding scale approach is no longer tenable.‖).
122
Metro., 554 U.S. at 116.
123
Id. at 117 (―We believe that Firestone means what the word ‗factor‘ implies, namely,
that when judges review the lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of
several different considerations of which a conflict of interest is one. . . . In such instances,
any one factor will act as a tie-breaker when the other factors are closely balanced, the
degree of closeness necessary depending upon the tiebreaking factor‘s inherent or casespecific importance. The conflict of interest at issue here, for example, should prove more
important (perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood
that it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to, cases where an
insurance company administrator has a history of biased claims administration.‖).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 119 (The Supreme Court‘s opinion was accompanied by concurrences from Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy and a dissenting opinion from Justice Scalia with
whom Justice Thomas joined).
126
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 176 L. Ed. 2d 469 (2010).
127
Id. at 1645.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1647.
131
Id. at 1645.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.; Frommert v. Conkright, 433 F.3d 254, 265–66 (2d Cir. 2006), rev‘d, 130 S. Ct.
1640 (2010) (―Since the terms of the phantom account were neither included in the 1989
Restatement nor included in the Plan‘s SPDs up through 1994, we disagree that the Plan
has always contained the phantom account or that its existence was adequately disclosed.
It is clear, under either an arbitrary or capricious standard or as a matter of law, that the
Plan administrator‘s conclusion that the Plan always included the phantom account is
unreasonable.‖).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Frommert v. Conkright, 472 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456–58 (W.D. N.Y. 2007).
139
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 at 1645.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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Id. at 1651–52 (―The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the District Court could
refuse to defer to the Plan Administrator‘s interpretation of the Plan on remand, simply
because the Court of Appeals had found a previous related interpretation by the
Administrator to be invalid. Because we reverse on that ground, we do not reach the
question whether the Court of Appeals also erred in applying a deferential standard of
review to the decision of the District Court on the merits.‖). The Supreme Court never
reached the second question on which it granted certiorari—whether the court of appeals
properly deferred to the district court—because it determined that the district court
erroneously refused to defer to the plan administrator‘s interpretation of the plan on
remand. The Supreme Court‘s answer to the first question on which it granted certiorari
precluded answering the second one.
143
Id. at 1646.
144
Id. (―It is undisputed that, under Firestone and the terms of the Plan, the Plan
Administrator here would normally be entitled to deference when interpreting the Plan.
See 328 F. Supp. 2d, at 430–31 (observing that the Plan grants the Plan Administrator
‗broad discretion in making decisions relative to the Plan‘). The Court of Appeals,
however, crafted an exception to Firestone deference. Specifically, the Second Circuit held
that a court need not apply a deferential standard ‗where the administrator ha[s] previously
construed the same [plan] terms and we found such a construction to have violated
ERISA.‘ 535 F.3d at 119. Under that view, the District Court here was entitled to reject a
reasonable interpretation of the Plan offered by the Plan Administrator, solely because the
Court of Appeals had overturned a previous interpretation by the Administrator. . . . We
reject this ‗one-strike-and-you‘re-out‘ approach. Brief for Petitioners 51. As an initial
matter, it has no basis in the Court‘s holding in Firestone . . .‖).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1646–47 (―[Firestone] set out a broad standard of deference without any
suggestion that the standard was susceptible to ad hoc exceptions like the one adopted by
the Court of Appeals. . . . Indeed, we refused to create such an exception
to Firestone deference in Glenn, recognizing that ERISA law was already complicated
enough without adding ―special procedural or evidentiary rules‖ to the mix. . . . If, as we
held in Glenn, a systemic conflict of interest does not strip a plan administrator of
deference, . . . it is difficult to see why a single honest mistake would require a different
result.‖); The Supreme Court‘s conclusion was a response to the court of appeals‘
reasoning in Frommert v. Conkright. The court of appeals stated, ―Defendants-Appellants
argue that the District Court erred in failing to adopt the plan administrator‘s proposed
approach, or at least consider it under a deferential standard of review. . . . However, the
District Court here had no decision to review because the plan administrator never
rendered any decision other than the original benefit determinations, all of which were
premised on the now-impermissible ‗phantom account‘ offset mechanism. . . . (‗[W]e may
give deferential review only to actual exercises of discretion.‘). Defendants-Appellants
have identified no authority in support of the proposition that a district court must afford
deference to the mere opinion of the plan administrator in a case, such as this, where the
administrator had previously construed the same terms and we found such a construction
to have violated ERISA.‖ Frommert v. Conkright, 535 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008); The
Supreme Court interpreted the court of appeals‘ reasoning in Frommert v. Conkright as
indicating that the district court could withhold deference on remand if it previously
determined that the plan administrator‘s interpretation of the plan violated ERISA. The
Supreme Court found that this interpretation conflicted with the Court‘s ruling in
Firestone, where the Court established a deferential standard of review for a plan
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administrator‘s discretionary determinations. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). More importantly, the Supreme Court did not elaborate any
exceptions to the deferential standard in Firestone of the type that the court of appeals
found permissible. Id. This construction of Firestone formed the basis for the Supreme
Court‘s rejection of the Second Circuit‘s approach.
147
Id. at 1647.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1648–49 (―Here trust law does not resolve the specific issue before us, but the
guiding principles we have identified underlying ERISA do. Congress enacted ERISA to
ensure that employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not
require employers to establish benefit plans in the first place. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517
U.S. 882, 887 (1996). We have therefore recognized that ERISA represents a ‗careful
balancing‘ between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans.‘ Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200,
215 (2004) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 39 (1987)). Congress sought ‗to create a system that is [not] so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering
[ERISA] plans in the first place.‘ Varity Corp., supra, at 497, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 134 L. Ed.
2d 130. ERISA ―induc[es] employers to offer benefits by assuring a predictable set of
liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of ultimate
remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred. Rush Prudential HMO,
Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 153 L. Ed. 2d 375 (2002).‖).
150
Id. at 1649.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. (―Firestone deference serves the interest of uniformity, helping to avoid a patchwork
of different interpretations of a plan, like the one here, that covers employees in different
jurisdictions—a result that ‗would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and
those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.‘‖).
154
Id. at 1652–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (In his dissent, which Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg joined, Breyer identified ―three significant mistakes involved in this case.‖ The
first concerned the 1989 amendment to Xerox Corporation‘s pension plan, which provided
that the benefits of returning employees would be offset by an amount attributable to the
lump-sum distributions the employees received when they first left Xerox. The 1989
amendments to the plan, however, said nothing about how the plan would calculate the
offset amount or that it would use the ―phantom account‖ method. The court of appeals
found the plan‘s omission and continued use of the ―phantom account‖ method to be
arbitrary and capricious and determined that the plan administrator‘s interpretation of the
plan violated ERISA.
Next, he noted that the Court committed a second error by affirming the district
court‘s acceptance of the plan administrator‘s argument that the 1989 amendments to
Xerox‘s pension plan incorporated the ―phantom account‖ method and rejected the
participant-petitioners‘ claim that neither the 1989 plan nor the 1989 Summary Plan
Description said anything about the ―phantom account‖ method. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals subsequently vacated the district court‘s decision on this issue and held that the
plan administrator‘s interpretation of the 1989 plan as incorporating the ―phantom
account‖ method, while in fact the plan said nothing about it, was arbitrary and capricious.
The court of appeals instructed the district court to ―employ equitable principles when
determining the appropriate [benefit] calculation and fashioning the appropriate remedy.‖
On remand, the district court determined that the appropriate remedy was to subtract out
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the amount of participant-petitioners‘ lump-sum distributions from their recalculated total
benefit. The court of appeals affirmed the district court‘s ruling.
Justice Breyer further insisted that the Supreme Court committed a third mistake in
Conkright. Citing Firestone, the Court stated that trust law governs the standard of review
in ERISA cases and requires courts to defer to a plan administrator‘s discretion to interpret
a plan. However, the Court also determined that trust law was unclear on the issue of
whether courts must defer to an administrator‘s second interpretation of a plan if the first
interpretation was arbitrary and capricious. Justice Breyer criticized the Court‘s conclusion
that trust law requires absolute deference to a plan administrator‘s every interpretation of a
plan and argued that ―trust law imposes no such rigid and inflexible requirement.‖ Justice
Breyer reasoned instead that ―the fact that trust law grants courts discretion does not mean
that they will exercise that discretion in all instances.‖ While trust law grants the courts
authority to defer to the trustee‘s discretion, it also permits them to craft a separate remedy
when a trustee acts unreasonably. Accordingly, Justice Breyer argued that the district court
acted reasonably by exercising its remedial authority to determine the method of
calculating the participant-respondents‘ benefits. The district court initially found that the
plan administrator abused his discretion by using the ―phantom account‖ method to adjust
the participant-respondents‘ benefits. On remand, the district court rejected the plan
administrator‘s other calculation method because it found that the method would violate
ERISA‘s notice provisions. Justice Breyer concluded that the district court reasonably
could have found it necessary to rely on its own remedial authority under the
circumstances. Unlike the majority in Conkright, Justice Breyer would have relied on the
principles of trust law to answer the question of whether the district court was required to
defer to the plan administrator‘s alternative interpretation of the plan terms.
Besides disagreeing with the Conkright majority on whether trust law provided the
appropriate framework for analysis, Justice Breyer also dissented from the Court‘s reliance
on ERISA-based policies to resolve the issue of whether the District Court was required to
defer to the plan administrator‘s interpretation on remand. Justice Breyer noted that the
policies which motivated the majority opinion, such as predictability, uniformity, and plan
creation, are in fact offset by the Court‘s ―one free honest mistake rule‖ which encourages
employers to draft ambiguous plans with the continued expectation of judicial deference to
their interpretations of the plan terms. Trust law, Justice Breyer argued, provides a better
guiding principle in ERISA cases and also leaves room for the supervising courts to decide
―how much weight to give to a plan administrator‘s remedial opinion‖ on review.
Finally, Breyer stated that he would have answered the second question on which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari—whether the court of appeals properly deferred to the
District Court on the merits. He reasoned that answering this question would depend ―on
how one characterizes the Court of Appeals‘ decision.‖ First, if the court of appeals
deferred to the district court‘s interpretation of the plan terms in order to determine the
appropriate benefit calculation method, then the appropriate standard of review under
Firestone would be de novo. If, however, the court of appeals deferred to the district
court‘s creation of a remedy based on equitable principles, then the correct standard of
review would be abuse of discretion. The district court‘s and the court of appeals‘ opinions
contained language that supported either interpretation, although Justice Breyer viewed the
court of appeals‘ decision as directed primarily to the district court‘s creation of a remedy.
As such, Justice Breyer stated that it was appropriate for the court of appeals to review the
district court‘s decision for abuse of discretion. The plan administrator insisted that the
court of appeals would have been prohibited from treating the district court‘s remedy as
anything other than an application of the plan terms because the participant-respondents
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sought relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which permits plaintiffs only to enforce
their rights under the terms of the plan. Breyer rejected this argument on the grounds that
seeking relief under § 1132(a)(1)(B) does not restrict a court‘s remedial authority or
prohibit a court from fashioning relief based on equitable principles. It may be especially
appropriate for a court to rely on equitable principles in cases where the plan administrator
fails to adequately notify employees of the plan terms. Justice Breyer concluded that he
would have affirmed the court of appeals‘ decision).
155
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,354–58 (July 23, 2010).
156
Id. at 43,352–54.
157
Quillen, supra note 39, at 71.
158
Id. Unlike an insured ERISA plan, a ―self-funded [ERISA] plan does not purchase an
insurance policy from any insurance company in order to satisfy its obligations to its
participants.‖ FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990). Consequently, state laws
regulating insurance ―do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans
may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business
of insurance for purposes of such state laws.‖ Id. at 61.
159
Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 602 (6th Cir. 2009).
160
Id. at 603.
161
Id. at 602.
162
Id. at 604–05.
163
Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334 (2003).
164
Ross, 558 F.3d at 605.
165
Id. (quoting Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341 (2003)
(―In Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 155 L.
Ed. 2d 468 (2003) (hereinafter ‗Miller‘), the Supreme Court clarified the appropriate test
to determine whether a state law regulates insurance under the ERISA savings clause.
There, the Court held that, first, ‗the state law must be specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance,‘ and, second, ‗the state law must substantially affect the risk-pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured[s].‘‖).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 606–07 (―First, the rules directly control the terms of insurance contracts by
prohibiting insurers and insureds from entering into contracts that include discretionary
clauses and prohibiting enforcement of such clauses. By changing the terms of enforceable
insurance contracts, the Commissioner has ‗alter[ed] the scope of permissible bargains
between insurers and insureds.‘ See Ward, 526 U.S. at 374–75 (explaining that the state
notice-prejudice rule changed the bargain between insured and insurer because it
effectively created a mandatory contract term that required the insurer to prove prejudice
before enforcing a timeliness-of-claim provision); see also Benefit Recovery Inc. v.
Donelon, 521 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the state insurance
commissioner‘s directive prohibiting insurers from enforcing subrogation rights until
insureds are fully compensated for their injuries alters the permissible bargains between
insureds and insurers by telling them what bargains are acceptable). Second, under the
rules, insurers can no longer invest the plan administrator with unfettered discretionary
authority to determine benefit eligibility or to construe ambiguous terms of a plan.
Prohibiting plan administrators from exercising discretionary authority in this manner
‗dictates to the insurance company the conditions under which it must pay for the risk it
has assumed.‘ Miller, 538 U.S. at 339 n.3. We therefore conclude that the rules regulate
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insurance because they substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between insureds
and insurers. As such, the rules fall within the scope of ERISA‘s savings clause.‖).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 607–08 (―Even if a state law regulates insurance such that it falls within ERISA‘s
savings clause, it may nevertheless be preempted by that statute‘s § 502(a) civil
enforcement provisions. In relevant part, § 502(a) allows an ERISA plan participant or
beneficiary to file a civil action ‗to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan.‘ 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, ERISA‘s civil
enforcement provisions are the ‗sort of overpowering federal policy that overrides a
statutory provision designed to save state law from being preempted.‘ Rush Prudential,
536 U.S. at 375. In Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 217–18, the Supreme Court explained that
ERISA‘s savings clause does not obviate the need for conflict preemption analysis, stating:
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional intent to create an
exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a). Under ordinary principles of conflict preemption, then, even a state law that can arguably be characterized as ‗regulating insurance‘
will be pre-empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of,
or in addition to, ERISA‘s remedial scheme. However, there is no state-law claim at issue
in this case that implicates ERISA‘s civil enforcement provisions. The rules do not
authorize any form of relief in state courts, either expressly or impliedly; they do not grant
a plan participant the ability to ‗recover benefits under the plan, enforce his rights under
the plan, or otherwise clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.‘ 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Put simply, the rules do not create, duplicate, supplant, or
supplement any of the causes of action that may be alleged under ERISA. Nor is there any
evidence that the rules serve as an alternative enforcement mechanism, outside of ERISA‘s
civil enforcement provisions such that the rules permit a plan beneficiary to assert a claim
that could otherwise be asserted under ERISA. Briscoe, 444 F.3d at 498. The rules at most
may affect the standard of judicial review if, and when, such a claim is brought before a
court. Accordingly, Michigan‘s rules do not conflict with ERISA‘s civil enforcement
provisions; thus, they are not removed from ERISA‘s savings clause on this basis.‖).
172
Id. at 608.
173
Id at 608–09.
174
Id. at 609.
175
Metro., 554 U.S. at 116.
176
Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2009). (―If,
as Glenn reaffirms, there is a conflict of interest when the same plan administrator decides
the merits of a benefits plan and pays that claim, and if, as Glenn also holds, it is consistent
with ERISA to account for that conflict of interest in reviewing a plan administrator‘s
decision, it is difficult to understand why a State should not be allowed to eliminate the
potential for such a conflict of interest by prohibiting discretionary clauses in the first
place. Nor is it necessarily the case, as the Insurance Industry suggests, that, if Michigan
can remove discretionary clauses, it will be allowed to dictate the standard of review for all
ERISA benefits claims. All that today‘s case does is allow a State to remove a potential
conflict of interest. And while Michigan‘s law may well establish that the courts will give
de novo review to lawsuits dealing with the meaning of an ERISA plan, it does not follow
that they will do so in reviewing the application of a settled term in the plan to a given
benefit request.‖).
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Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 78 U.S.L.W.
3667 (May 17, 2010).
178
Id. at 840.
179
Id. at 840–42.
180
Id. at 841.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 842.
185
Id. (Under Miller, a state law regulates insurance if it is specifically directed toward the
insurance industry and substantially affects the risk pooling arrangement between insurer
and insured).
186
Id. at 849.
187
Id. at 842.
188
Id.
189
Id. (―We agree with the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in American Council of Life Insurers v.
Ross, 558 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2009). In that case, the Sixth Circuit confronted a Michigan
prohibition on discretionary clauses. It concluded, as we do, that ‗[g]iven that the rules
impose conditions only on an insurer‘s right to engage in the business of insurance in [the
state,] . . . the rules are directed toward entities engaged in the business of insurance.‘ Id. at
605―); Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (―[S]tate
laws are ‗directed toward entities engaged in insurance‘ if insurers are regulated with
respect to their insurance practices. Id. Here, there can be no serious dispute that the rules
meet the first prong of the Miller test because they regulate insurers with respect to
their insurance practices. . . . Given that the rules impose conditions only on an insurer‘s
right to engage in the business of insurance in Michigan, we conclude that the rules are
directed towards entities engaged in the business of insurance. See Miller, 538 U.S. at
337 (‗[The laws] regulate [] insurance by imposing conditions on the right to engage in the
business of insurance.‘)‖).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 843.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 844.
195
Id. at 842–44 (―Standard next argues that the practice is not specifically directed at
insurers because it merely applies ‗laws of general application that have some bearing on
insurers.‘ Kentucky Ass‘n, 538 U.S. at 334. To Standard, the practice is nothing more than
an attempt to apply the common-law rule that contracts are interpreted against their drafter.
. . . Morrison‘s practice is grounded in policy concerns specific to the insurance industry,
such as ensuring fair treatment of claims by insurers with potential conflicts of interest. It
is indeed directed at insurance companies.‖).
196
Id. at 844.
197
Id. (―Insurance companies‘ core function is to accept a number of risks from
policyholders in exchange for premiums. Some of the risks accepted will result in actual
losses. Risk pooling involves spreading losses ‗over all the risks so as to enable the insurer
to accept each risk.‘ Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 127–28, 102 S. Ct.
3002, 73 L. Ed. 2d 647 & n.7 (1982). By receiving a large number of relatively small
premiums, the insurer can afford to compensate the few insureds who suffer losses. In this
way, the insured no longer bears more than a small amount of his own risk—it has been
transferred into a common pool into which all members of the pool contribute by paying
premiums. The requirement that insurance regulations substantially affect risk pooling
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ensures that the regulations are targeted at insurance practices, not merely at insurance
companies. See Kentucky Ass‘n, 538 U.S. at 338 (noting that, absent the risk pooling
requirement, ‗any state law aimed at insurance companies could be deemed a law that
regulates insurance‘ (internal quotation marks omitted)). For instance, a state law requiring
insurers to pay their janitors twice the minimum wage would not regulate insurance
because it would have no effect on the risk-pooling relationship between insurers and the
insured. Id. Standard argues for a definition of risk pooling that it claims is used in the
insurance industry. According to such definition, risk is pooled at the time the insurance
contract is made, not at the time a claim is made.‖).
198
Id. (Standard argued that ―[a]dministrative factors such as ‗claim investigations, the
appeals process, and litigation‘ can ‗affect amounts paid to insureds under [a] policy,‘ but
are outside of the risk pooling arrangement‖). Standard‘s goal in presenting this argument
was to persuade the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Montana‘s ban on discretionary
clauses, by failing to satisfy the second prong of the Miller test, does not fall under the
savings clause and is therefore preempted by ERISA. In short, Standard sought to prevent
Commissioner Morrison‘s ban on discretionary clauses from being enforced.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 844–45 (―Montana insureds may no longer agree to a discretionary clause in
exchange for a more affordable premium. The scope of permissible bargains between
insurers and insureds has thus narrowed.‖).
201
Id. at 845.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 846.
205
Id. (quoting Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (holding that ERISA
preempts a Texas state law which allows claimants to recover damages when an HMO
fails to exercise ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions).
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. (―‗[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the
ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the
ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted.‘ Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209. . . .
Here, however, there is no additional remedy. Insureds may only recover the value of the
denied claim from their insurers. The practice neither ‗authorize[s] any form of relief in
state courts‘ nor ‗serve[s] as an alternate enforcement mechanism[ ] outside of ERISA‘s
civil enforcement provisions.‘ Am. Council of Life Ins., 558 F.3d at 607; see also Aetna
Health, 542 U.S. at 218 (‗[E]ven a state law . . . regulating insurance will be pre-empted if
it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits outside of, or in addition to,
ERISA‘s remedial scheme.‘ (internal quotation marks omitted)). . . . Since it adds nothing
the ERISA scheme does not already contemplate, the practice is distinguishable from cases
in which a state attempts to meld a new remedy to the ERISA framework.‖). If
Commissioner Morrison‘s ban on discretionary clauses created a new remedy outside of or
in addition to the exclusive list of remedies under ERISA Section 502 (29 U.S.C. § 1132),
ERISA would preempt Commissioner Morrison‘s practice pursuant to § 514 (29 U.S.C. §
1144).
209
Id. at 847.
210
Id.
211
Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008)).
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Id. (―[W]e must balance ERISA‘s preemptive scope with its ‗antiphonal‘ acceptance of
state insurance regulation. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 364.‖).
213
Id. (―Glenn involved an exercise of the Court‘s power to make federal common law, as
evidenced by its frequent reference to trust law and the absence of any applicable state
insurance regulation. The Court‘s refusal to create a system of universal de novo review
does not necessarily mean that states are categorically forbidden from issuing insurance
regulations with such effect. After all, the states have retained power to institute quite a
number of rules affecting ERISA plans pursuant to their savings clause powers. See,
e.g., Kentucky Ass‘n, 538 U.S. at 329; Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 355; UNUM Life, 526
U.S. at 358; Metro. Life, 471 U.S. at 724‖).
214
Id. at 847–48.
215
Id. at 848
216
Id. at 848–49.
217
Id. at 849 (―Although we acknowledge the tension between the Commissioner‘s
practice and federal common law concerning the standard of review, we see nothing that
would justify taking the extraordinary step of creating a new exclusion under the savings
clause. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the Commissioner‘s practice of
disapproving discretionary clauses is not preempted by ERISA‘s exclusive remedial
scheme.‖).
218
Hancock v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 590 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2009).
219
Id. at 1149.
220
Id. at 1144.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. (―[T]he Plan grant[ed] MetLife ‗discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the
Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits in accordance with the
terms of the Plan.‘‖).
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 1143–44 (Verla Hancock died in 2004. Verla‘s daughter Terri discovered her
mother‘s body; the police report stated that a bottle of Oxycontin was found nearby. The
medical examiner, however, listed the cause of death as undetermined because the
toxicology results and the autopsy showed no evidence of disease, injury, or intoxication
sufficient to explain death. Verla had designated Terri Hancock as her beneficiary under
the plan. Ms. Hancock filed a claim for life insurance and AD & D benefits in 2005).
228
Id. at 1144–45 (Hancock subsequently appealed the denial of benefits and cited two
conversations she had with the investigating detective and the medical examiner, both of
whom stated that Verla‘s death may have resulted from a slip and fall accident. MetLife
denied the appeal on the ground that Hancock‘s evidence was conjecture and did not show
that an accident caused Verla‘s death. Hancock submitted additional evidence in 2006 but
MetLife never responded. Hancock then sued MetLife in Utah state court, alleging breach
of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, among other claims.
MetLife reaffirmed its denial of AD & D benefits just a day later and also filed a motion to
remove the case to federal court).
229
Id.
230
Id. at 1145.
231
Id. (Hancock also argued that MetLife had a conflict of interest and made procedural
errors in handling her claim. The district court decided each motion on the merits.)
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Id.(―[The district court] denied Ms. Hancock‘s motion for partial summary judgment,
holding that ERISA preempted Rule 590-218 and that MetLife was entitled to arbitraryand-capricious review.‖).
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 1145–46.
236
Id. at 1146.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 1148 (―Rule 590-218 can be applied to the Plan only if it is not preempted by
ERISA. ERISA expressly preempts any state law ‗insofar as [it] may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan,‘ see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), unless the law ‗regulates
insurance, banking, or securities,‘ id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The issue before us is whether Rule
590-218 regulates insurance.‖).
241
Id.
242
Id. (quoting Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003)).
243
Id.
244
Id. (―MetLife does not dispute that Rule 590-218 satisfies Miller‘s first prong. We
therefore turn to prong two.‖).
245
Id. at 1149.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 1149.
249
Id. (―If Rule 590-218 imposed a blanket prohibition on the use of discretion-granting
clauses, we would have a different case.‖).
250
Id.
251
Id.; Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 333 (2003) (In order to
determine if a practice falls within the business of insurance, it has to form ―part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.‖).
252
Id. at 1149–50.
253
Id. (―Ms. Hancock contends that Rule 590-218 affects risk pooling because if
discretion-granting clause does not substantially conform to the rule‘s safe-harbor
language, the clause is invalid, the insurer is deprived of discretion, and the resulting de
novo review affects the risk pool by causing more reversals of benefit denials. Her
argument proves too much. By her logic, any requirement, no matter how trivial (for
example, a requirement that the plan be printed on mauve paper), affects risk pooling
simply because an insurer‘s noncompliance would divest it of discretion, trigger de novo
review, and change its risks. We decline to interpret Miller so broadly.‖).
254
Hancock, 590 F.3d at 1150 (―The change in risk pooling must result
from compliance with the state law, not its violation.‖).
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 1150–51 (Hancock also raised two contentions at oral argument which the Tenth
Circuit dismissed on the merits. Hancock first argued that Rule 590-218 only permits
insurers to restrict the scope of review but not the standard of review. Hancock asserted
that the scope of review comprehends the material that a court may examine in evaluating
a plan administrator‘s decision, whereas the standard of review involves the level of
judicial deference. The Tenth Circuit rejected Hancock‘s argument as it leads to the
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conclusion that Rule 590-218 categorically prohibits deferential review. The Court of
Appeals rejected such an interpretation as ―nonsensical‖ in light of the rule‘s safe-harbor
language granting the administrator discretion to interpret the plan terms and to determine
eligibility for benefits. The Court concluded that the phrase ―scope of review‖ in the safeharbor language must be a reference to the extent of judicial deference to the plan
administrator and not the materials a court may consider. Hancock also asserted at oral
argument that the rule‘s safe-harbor provision only applies if the insurance company is the
plan administrator. The Tenth Circuit rejected Hancock‘s argument because the rule
plainly reserves discretion to the plan administrator or the insurance company acting as a
plan administrator. The Court refused to interpret the safe-harbor provision in a way that
would render the term ―plan administrator‖ redundant. The Court reiterated its holding that
ERISA preempts Rule 590-218 because the rule has no substantial effect on risk pooling
and fails to qualify as a law regulating insurance. The Court held that MetLife‘s
discretionary clause was valid.)
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 1153.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 1154 (―MetLife received Ms. Hancock‘s [appeal] letter on February 13, 2006.
Ten days later it informed her that it would be ‗willing to conduct a further administrative
review,‘ id. at 142, provided that she agree that her submissions be part of the
administrative record that could be reviewed by a court. On March 3 Ms. Hancock agreed
and asked MetLife to proceed with its review. More than three months passed with no
decision from MetLife. On June 27, 2006, Ms. Hancock‘s attorney wrote to MetLife,
noting that he had contacted MetLife over 20 times in the previous months and was always
told only that ‗the claim is in the review process,‘ without additional explanation. Id. at
134. The letter threatened suit for breach of contract if Metlife did not pay the disputed
AD&D benefits within ten days. On September 12 Ms. Hancock, still without a decision
on her appeal, filed suit. MetLife denied Ms. Hancock‘s second appeal the next day. The
denial letter stated that it only supplemented the first appeal-denial letter and did not
replace it. It again cited the Plan‘s AD&D provision and summarized MetLife‘s reasons
for denying the claim and the first appeal. It then stated that the MRA report ‗d[id] not
demonstrate with certainty that the decedent had an accident‘ and that the slip-meter test
said nothing about Verla Hancock‘s actual cause of death. Id. at 132. From this
correspondence we cannot conclude that MetLife denied Ms. Hancock a full and fair
review. MetLife did not ignore her evidence; it merely found it inconclusive. Both appealdenial letters took into account the information Ms. Hancock had submitted and then
reasonably explained why the information was insufficient to support the accidental-death
theory.‖).
263
Id. (―Ordinarily, we review discretionary benefit decisions under an arbitrary-andcapricious standard. See Kellogg, 549 F.3d at 825. But if the plan administrator or
fiduciary operates under a conflict of interest, we decrease our deference in proportion to
the seriousness of the conflict. See Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997,
1004 (10th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). At one time we distinguished between standard
conflicts and inherent conflicts to determine how much deference to withhold. If the
conflict was standard—that is, if the fiduciary‘s or administrator‘s ‗dual role jeopardized
[its] impartiality,‘ id. at 1005 (internal quotation marks omitted)—and the claimant could
not establish that the conflict was serious, we considered the conflict as one factor in
determining whether the benefit denial was arbitrary and capricious, see id. But if the
conflict was inherent—for example, if the administrator of the plan was also its insurer—
the burden shifted to the conflicted party to prove that its decision was not arbitrary and

2010]

POST-FIRESTONE SKIRMISHES

47

capricious. See id. at 1006.‖). This approach arose out of the Court of Appeals‘ uncertainty
as to how to apply the Supreme Court‘s holding in Firestone that a conflict of interest must
be taken into account on review of a discretionary benefit denial. The approach in the
Tenth Circuit had been to withhold some degree of deference and shift the burden to the
conflicted party to prove that its benefit determination had not been arbitrary and
capricious.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id. at 1156.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
See generally Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §503, 88
Stat 829, 893 (1974).
270
Id. at § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).
271
In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) the Supreme Court held that
state external review processes were not preempted by ERISA. These procedures do not
apply to self-insured plans.
272
As one might expect, there are a number of ways in which a plan can lose its
grandfathered status.
273
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119.
274
I am indebted to Colleen Medill for the following summary of the model act. See
Medill, Instructor‘s Note to Student Supplemental Materials (Fall 2010), 2010, at
http://www.medill-employee-benefits.com/display.asp?displayID=Fall2010SS.pdf. ―Under
the Model Act, the participant must first exhaust the plan‘s internal grievance procedure
and receive a final adverse determination of the claim before seeking external independent
review of the plan administrator‘s decision. Model Act section 7. The participant must file
a request for external independent review with the state insurance commissioner. Model
Act section 8. Among the consumer protections provided by the Model Act, the
independent reviewer must be an expert in the treatment of the participant‘s medical
condition that is the subject of the participant‘s claim. If a physician serves as an external
reviewer, the physician must be currently licensed and be certified by a recognized
American medical specialty board in the area or areas that are the subject of the review.
Model Act section 3B. The participant may submit additional written information to the
independent reviewer to support the participant‘s claim that was not initially submitted to
the plan‘s administrator. In rendering an opinion, the independent reviewer is not bound by
the prior judgments or opinions of the plan administrator. The decision of the independent
external reviewer is binding on the plan administrator and cannot be appealed through
litigation. Model Act section 11.‖
275
According to BNA, forty-four states currently have some kind of external review
procedure in place. All states have until July 1, 2011 to amend their procedures to comply
with NAIC‘s model act. Administration Issues Rules Strengthening Health Plan Coverage
Appeals Process, 37 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) No. 29 at 1628. July 27, 2010.
276
Section 2719 of the Public Health Service Act, as amended by Section 1001 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, requires group health plans and health
insurance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage to provide an
external review process that, ―at a minimum, includes the consumer protections set forth in
the Uniform External Review Model Act promulgated by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and is binding on such plans.‖ Patient Protection and Affordable
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Care Act, § 1001. Plans and issuers must comply with the applicable State or Federal
external review process. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,356 (July 23, 2010).
Generally, if a State external review process that applies to and is binding on an issuer
offering group health insurance coverage includes ―at a minimum the consumer
protections in the NAIC Uniform Model Act, then the issuer must comply with the
applicable State external review process and is not required to comply with the Federal
external review process‖ that is set forth in the regulations. Id. Group health plans do not
have to comply with either the State or Federal external review process to the extent that
the benefits they offer are provided through group health insurance coverage. Id. However,
if a group health plan offers benefits other than through health insurance coverage (e.g. if
the plan is self-insured) and is subject to a State external review process that is not
preempted by ERISA and includes at a minimum the consumer protections in the NAIC
Uniform Model Act, then the plan must comply with the applicable State external review
process and is not required to comply with the Federal external review process. Id. The
Department of Health and Human Services will determine whether the applicable State
external review process contains all the minimum consumer protections in the NAIC
Uniform Model Act. Id. Minimum standards for State external review processes include,
among others, effective written notice to participants about their rights to external review,
shifting the cost of an independent review organization (IRO) onto the plan or issuer
against whom a request for external review is filed, random IRO assignment, exclusion of
IROs with conflicts of interest, and no minimum claim threshold for the claim to be
eligible for external review. Id. at 43,356–57.
277
If a plan or issuer does not have to comply with a State external review process, then
the plan or issuer must comply with the federal external review process that is set forth in
the regulations. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers
Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,357 (July 23, 2010).
278
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (―Where the plan provides
to the contrary by granting ‗the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits,‘ Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added), ‗[t]rust
principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate,‘ . . .‖); Holmstrom v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2010) (―Judicial review of an ERISA
administrator‘s benefits determination is de novo unless the plan grants the administrator
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (1989). When the administrator has such discretionary
authority, as the vast majority now do, the court applies a more deferential standard,
seeking to determine only whether the administrator‘s decision was ‗arbitrary and
capricious.‘ . . . The plan here provided such discretionary authority, so we review under
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.‖).
279
See Holmstrom v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 758, 761–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (―This
case illustrates the difficult problems presented by claims for disability insurance by
people with serious and painful conditions that do not have objectively measurable
symptoms. Plaintiff Lanette Holmstrom . . . participated in an employee welfare benefit
plan administered by defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (‗MetLife‘). . . . In
late 1999, Holmstrom sought the care of Dr. Eric Lomax to treat pain, numbness, and
tingling she experienced in her right upper arm. In January 2000, Holmstrom had surgery
to remedy a right ulnar nerve compression and neuropathy. The surgery provided little
relief, and her symptoms soon worsened. In June 2000, she had another surgery to relieve
what was thought to be nerve compression. Her symptoms worsened further after this
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second procedure, prompting her to visit a pain clinic. The clinic doctors diagnosed CRPS
Type I, a chronic neurological syndrome characterized by severe pain. In March 2002,
Holmstrom underwent a third surgery, which also failed to relieve her symptoms. She saw
another pain specialist, Dr. Weber. According to MetLife‘s records, Dr. Weber ‗made a
definitive diagnosis of . . . complex regional pain syndrome.‘ It was clear to Holmstrom
and her doctors that surgery could do nothing to help her, leaving medication as her only
recourse. Holmstrom‘s pain medication regimen has included a variety of powerful drugs,
including Amitriptyline, Bextra, Clonidine, methadone, MS Contin, MSIR, Neurontin,
Oxycontin, Oxycodone, Oxyfast, Percocet, Topamax, and (prior to its recall) Vioxx.
Holmstrom‘s symptoms persisted without improvement for the next three years. MetLife‘s
records from 2003 describe a ‗high pain med[ication] regimen‘ causing side effects such as
confusion and memory loss, and pain of such intensity that Holmstrom was ‗considering
having nerve severed since all other kinds of pain management techniques have failed.‘
The record reveals no improvement through 2004 and 2005. Dr. Ted Vant, who has been
Holmstrom‘s treating physician from 2004 to the time of this lawsuit, prescribed
significant doses of strong medications in an attempt to manage her symptoms.‖).
280
Interim Final Rules on Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,562–65 (June 17, 2010).
281
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,354 (July 23, 2010).
282
Interim Final Rules on Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to
Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,564–65 (June 17, 2010).
283
―Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title and title
IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(a)] and not exempt
under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C.S. § 1003(b)].‖ 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2010).
284
Ky. Ass‘n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
285
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 364–65 (2002).
286
Id. at 402 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
287
Id. (―For the reasons noted by the Court, independent review provisions may sound
very appealing. Efforts to expand the variety of remedies available to aggrieved
beneficiaries beyond those set forth in ERISA are obviously designed to increase the
chances that patients will be able to receive treatments they desire, and most of us are
naturally sympathetic to those suffering from illness who seek further options.
Nevertheless, the Court would do well to remember that no employer is required to
provide any health benefit plan under ERISA and that the entire advent of managed care,
and the genesis of HMOs, stemmed from spiraling health costs. To the extent that
independent review provisions such as 4-10 make it more likely that HMOs will have to
subsidize beneficiaries‘ treatments of choice, they undermine the ability of HMOs to
control costs, which, in turn, undermines the ability of employers to provide health care
coverage for employees. As a consequence, independent review provisions could create a
disincentive to the formation of employee health benefit plans, a problem that Congress
addressed by making ERISA‘s remedial scheme exclusive and uniform. While it may well
be the case that the advantages of allowing States to implement independent review
requirements as a supplement to the remedies currently provided under ERISA outweigh

50

WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 2:1

this drawback, this is a judgment that, pursuant to ERISA, must be made by Congress. I
respectfully dissent.‖).
288
States Beef Up Bans on ―Discretionary Clauses‖ as Courts Rule Out ERISA Hurdle, 37
PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) No. 7, at 377, (February 16, 2010). Since passage of the
PPACA, a spokesperson for America‘s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) said that health
plans ―have a long track record of supporting third-party review to give patients greater
peace of mind about their health care coverage.‖ Administration Issues Rules
Strengthening Health Plan Coverage Appeals Process, 37 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) No.
29, at 1628 (July 27, 2010).
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
―Private-sector employees contributed $79.5 billion to employment-based private
health insurance premiums in 2000, up from $22.8 billion in 1987.‖ See Employer
Spending on Health Care: 1987–2000, Employee Benefits Research Institute,
http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=1202fact (last visited July 19, 2010).
293
Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica Smith. U.S. Census Bureau,
Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2006 at 18 (2007),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf.
294
See John Langbein, supra note 7, at 1324 (2007).
295
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2008) (―The first
question asks whether the fact that a plan administrator both evaluates claims for benefits
and pays benefits claims creates the kind of ‗conflict of interest‘ to which Firestone‘s
fourth principle refers. In our view, it does. That answer is clear where it is the employer
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